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Part I describes the links between contemporary bias against Muslims and Latines
and its historical roots. The groups whom Americans fear change, but the script is
the same. The rationales for limiting who could be naturalized as American citizens
and who could immigrate to this country in the late 19th and early 20th centuries
are similar to the rationales given for discriminating today against Muslims and
Latines. These reasons fall into two broad categories: empirically-identifiable traits
which (presumably) made assimilation into American culture difficult if not
impossible; and a normative conception of who should be Americans.
The legal embodiment of this heritage of bias can be traced to a 1790 federal statute
stating that only free white persons could be naturalized. Initially, whites included
the northern and western Europeans who were the bulk of the U.S. population in
1790. But the arrival of new immigrants from Ireland, China, Japan, India, and
southern and eastern Europe between the middle of the 19th, and early decades of
the 20th century put immense pressure on the legal definition of “white” as well as on
the political response to changing immigration patterns.
Part II provides a brief review of the interpretive approaches that courts used to
define “white” (textualism vs. intentionalism). Most important is the “functional
textualist” approach to defining statutory language, because that allowed the
historical text to adapt to new circumstances—in this instance to adapt “white” to
include at least some new immigrants who were considered able to assimilate into
American culture.
Part III of the Article describes the negative political and legal reactions to the
arrival of different groups of immigrants. Those reactions emphasized the difficulty
that these immigrants had in assimilating into American culture. Each of these
groups endured negative stereotypes, but Asians were treated worse than Europeans.
Unlike Europeans, Asians were denied the right to become naturalized American
citizens and were prevented from immigrating into the United States because they
were not white. By contrast, Europeans were always considered white and were never
barred from immigrating, although they were subjected to severe quota restrictions.
Part IV compares the more favorable treatment of southern Italians with the less
favorable treatment of Asian Indians, despite southern Italians faring no better and
sometimes worse on criteria relevant to assimilation. A contributing factor in making
this distinction was the assumption, associated with the eugenics movement, that
Asian Indians were a different species who were genetically incapable of
assimilating. But there was something else at work that disfavored Asian Indians—a
normative judgment that the country should remain a homogenously white nation by
favoring Europeans over Asian people of color.
The Article concludes with a reminder that restrictive assumptions about who can
assimilate and who deserves to be an American persist. Bias against Muslims and
Latines is simply the modern version of bias against Asian people. These patterns of
thought are as embedded in the American psyche as the inclusive ideals that we
profess. The hope of this Article is that remembering our history will give us a better
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chance of attaining those ideals than simply bathing in the warm glow of a past that
never was.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Empirical and Normative Justifications for Bias
The contemporary bias against Muslims and Latines is not an aberration.
The immigrant groups that Americans fear have changed, but the script is the
same. As the following pages will reveal, the rationales for preventing those who
could be naturalized as American citizens or who could immigrate to this country in
the late 19th and early 20th centuries are strikingly similar to the reasons given by
those who would now prevent immigration by Muslims and Latines.1 These reasons
fall into two broad categories—empirically identifiable traits, which were supposed
to make assimilation into American culture difficult if not impossible, and a
normative conception of who should be Americans.
Among the empirical traits are a propensity for crime, an association with
disease, and a likelihood of being poor. First, there is the contemporary fear of
criminal behavior by Muslims, stoked by then-presidential candidate Trump’s claim
that Muslims were dancing in the streets of New Jersey after 9/11.2 The chosen
remedy—a geographically-based exclusion of Muslims—is reminiscent of the 1917
Asiatic Barred Zone Act.3 Similarly, Trump’s campaign promises to prevent Latines
immigration to the United States relied in part on their alleged propensity for
crime; at Trump’s campaign announcement in June 2015, he said that people
crossing the Mexican border are “bringing drugs; they’re bringing crime . . . .”4
These fears are an echo of the fear of criminal behavior by different groups of late
19th and early 20th century immigrants.5
1

2

3

4

5

Robert S. Chang, Whitewashing Precedent: From the Chinese Exclusion Case to Korematsu to the Muslim
Travel Ban Cases, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1183, 1184–91 (2018) (comparing the Muslim ban to excluding
Chinese and to Japanese internment); Kevin R. Johnson, Trump’s Latines Repatriation, 66 UCLA L. REV.
1444, 1467–96 (2019) (comparing Trump’s immigration enforcement policies to earlier Latines repatriation
campaigns); Rose Cuison Villazor & Kevin R. Johnson, The Trump Administration and the War on
Immigration Diversity, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 575, 578 & passim (2019) (“[W]hen situated within the
history of immigration laws and policies in the United States, the current war against immigration diversity
exhibits the Administration's broader goal of returning to pre-1965 immigration policies designed to maintain
a “white nation.”).
Jim Dwyer, A Definitive Debunking of Donald Trump’s 9/11 Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/nyregion/a-definitive-debunking-of-donald-trumps-9-11-claims.html;
see also George A. Martínez, Law, Race, and the Epistemology of Ignorance, 17 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY
L.J. 507, 530 (2020) (Trump links terrorist attacks and a Muslim ban based on the difficulty Muslims have
in assimilating into Western culture).
The geographically-based exclusion of Muslims was upheld by the Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii, 138
S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (discussing Executive Orders 13769 and 13780). The Asiatic Barred Zone Act was
adopted by the Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875–78 (repealed 1952).
Michael D. Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Stoking Fears, Trump Defied Bureaucracy to Advance
Immigration Agenda N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/23/us/politics/trumpimmigration.html.
See infra text accompanying notes 143, 195, 270, 288, 296, 313, 328, 355.
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Second, fear of disease was advanced as a reason for barring Latines
immigration—regarding Haitians, then-candidate Trump is alleged to have said
that “[t]hey all have AIDS,” and, regarding Mexicans, that they bring “tremendous
infectious disease.”6 A concern that immigrants would bring disease was one of the
justifications for hostility to various groups of early immigrants.7 Third, recent rules
making it harder for people to immigrate to the United States if there is a risk of
their becoming a public charge (not limited to Muslims and Latines) also motivated
anti-immigrant provisions in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.8
The normative reasons for bias against Muslims and Latines are direct
descendants of the effort to preserve the homogeneity of a European-based white
America, which fueled the late 19th and early 20th-century prohibition of
naturalization and immigration by non-Europeans.9 Today, this manifests itself in
the palpable fears by a white majority that non-white immigrants will replace white
Americans,10 and that the country will soon become majority-minority (projected to
occur before 2050),11 fears which feed the bias against Muslims and Latines who
might try to become Americans.
B. Naturalization and Immigration Law
United States naturalization legislation began with a 1790 federal statute
stating that only free white persons could be naturalized—that is, become U.S.
6

7
8

9
10

11

Shear, supra note 4 (discussion regarding Haitians); Rupert Neate, Donald Trump: Mexican Migrants Bring
‘Tremendous Infectious Disease’ to US, GUARDIAN (July 6, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/jul/06/donald-trump-mexican-immigrants-tremendous-infectious-disease (discussion regarding
Mexicans).
See infra text accompanying notes 180, 195, 270, 288, 296.
Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292 (Aug. 14, 2019); see infra text accompanying
notes 176, 265, 283, 349.
See infra notes 298, 391.
See Engy Abdelkader, Our Country Is Full, 45 HUM. RTS. 1, 21–22 (2020) (“According to public opinion
polling data . . . 63 percent of Republicans believe that immigrants are invading our country and replacing
our cultural and ethnic background. Significantly, such beliefs underpin the white supremacist ‘great
replacement’ or ‘white genocide’ theory. According to this conspiracy theory, non-white populations are
‘replacing’ white people vis-à-vis mass immigration.”); John Reynolds, Emergency and Migration, Race and
the Nation, 67 UCLA L. REV. 1768, 1787 (2021) (“Like the great replacement conspiracy, white genocide is a
byword among white supremacists for immigration and demographic trends that will lead not just to the
loss of white majority status, but to the elimination of the white ‘race’ as such.”); Darin E.W. Johnson,
Homegrown and Global: The Rising Terror Movement, 58 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1071 (2020) (“This theory,
also referred to as The Great Replacement, posits that the existential decline of the white race is furthered
by rising immigration and declining fertility among white women.”); Juan F. Perea, Immigration Policy as a
Defense of White Nationhood, 12 GEO. J. L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 1, 2 (2020) (“Immigrants of color
on the southern border . . . threaten the prevailing conception of the United States as a country controlled
and dominated by whites and their culture.”).
Ryan W. Miller, 46% of Whites Worry Becoming a Majority-Minority Nation Will ‘Weaken American
Culture,’ Survey Says, USA TODAY (Mar. 21, 2019, 2:00 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/03/21/pew-survey-whites-fearful-minority-country-willweaken-american-culture/3217218002/ (“The U.S. Census Bureau predicts that before 2050, the majority of
the USA will be made up of minority populations. According to Pew's research, 46 percent of white people
fear that would weaken U.S. culture.”).
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citizens.12 After some uncertainty, the courts ended up deciding that Asians did not
fit that definition, the most notable examples of which were two Supreme Court
cases—one dealing with Japanese in 192213 and the other with Asian Indians in
1923.14 The continuity between historical and contemporary bias is apparent in the
judicial emphasis on an inability to assimilate as a way to identify who was not
“white” and therefore ineligible for naturalization, a standard that has also been
used to justify policies discriminating against Muslim and Latines immigration.
Naturalization was important because some states prohibited a noncitizen
from owning land;15 from obtaining a license to practice certain jobs;16 from
qualifying for most public works projects during the Depression;17 and from gaining
the political clout that came with voting.18 In addition, a 1922 Act (repealed in 1931)
stripped a woman of citizenship if she married an alien ineligible for
naturalization.19 And, for the majority of immigrants who planned to stay in the
country, “whiteness” was undoubtedly an important symbolic statement that they
belonged.
Eventually, the white requirement on naturalization was selectively deleted
for the Chinese in 194320 and for Asian Indians in 1946 (hereinafter referred to as
“Indians”).21 This selective easing of the white requirement probably occurred to
avoid having the United States appear to be similar to Nazi Germany. When the
Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization resigned in 1944, he noted that
the only country outside of the United States that discriminated on the basis of race
12

13
14
15

16
17

18

19
20

21

Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (1790); see generally IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE
LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996).
Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922).
United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 215 (1923).
See MILTON R. KONVITZ, THE ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW 161 (1946). The California Alien Land
Law of 1913 applied to aliens ineligible for citizenship, and the California Attorney General admitted that
the law was based on “race undesirability.” Id. at 159. However, the Court in Porterfield v. Webb held that
the prohibition of aliens owning land did not violate equal protection. 263 U.S. 225, 232–33 (1923).
See generally KONVITZ, supra note 15, at 190–211 (displaying a list of occupations restricted in each state).
See Gary R. Hess, The "Hindu" in America: Immigration and Naturalization Policies and India, 1917-1946,
38 PAC. HIST. REV. 59, 71 (1969).
Beginning with Louisiana in 1812, most newly admitted states barred aliens from voting, and others
revoked laws allowing aliens to vote. See ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY IN
THE FASHIONING OF AMERICA 110 (2006). In 1996, federal law made it illegal for a non-citizen to vote in
federal elections. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208, div. C, § 215, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-572 (1996).
Cable Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-346, § 3, 42 Stat. 1021, 1022 (1922) (repealed 1931).
Magnuson Act (also known as the Chinese Exclusion Repeal Act), Pub. L. No. 78-199, § 3, 57 Stat. 600, 601
(1943). The repeal of the Chinese exclusion laws did not entirely eliminate discrimination against Chinese
people. If a Chinese person lived in a country other than China, he or she still came to this country on the
Chinese quota of 100 persons, which was not generally true of other groups; the wife of a Chinese man came
in on the Chinese quota, which was not true of the wives of other immigrants. See KONVITZ, supra note 15,
at 28.
See Luce-Celler Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-483, § 303(a)(3), 60 Stat. 416 (1946).
Two other statutes reversed limitations on citizenship imposed by the 1790 law. First, the post-Civil War
Naturalization Act of 1870 extended naturalization to aliens of African nativity and descent, see Pub. L. No.
41-254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256 (1870). Second, the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 granted citizenship to
American Indians born in the United States. Pub. L. 68-175, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924).
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in matters of naturalization was Nazi Germany, which he emphasized was not “very
desirable company.”22 Finally, in 1952, the McCarran-Walter Act deleted the white
requirement for naturalization altogether.23
Naturalization law was not the only reason for worrying about the ability of
immigrants to assimilate. The influx of Irish, Chinese, Japanese, Indians, and
southern and eastern European immigrants in the middle to late 19th and early
20th centuries not only put significant pressure on the meaning of the legal term
“white,” but also led to laws restricting immigration—prohibiting Asians and
imposing severe restrictions on immigration by southern and eastern Europeans.
Although these politically motivated immigration rules did not usually turn on a
legal definition of who was white, they were influenced by the same assumptions
about assimilation that determined who was white. The deep connection between
the rules applicable to immigration and naturalization was apparent in the 1924
law forbidding immigration by members of any group who could not be naturalized
(for example, Japanese people were among this group, after the 1922 Ozawa case
interpreted the naturalization law to mean that a Japanese person was not white).24
This connection was also apparent in the 1923 Thind case denying that Indians
were white, in part because a 1917 law forbid immigration by Indians.25 As one
federal court noted in a 1944 case, “the naturalization and immigration acts have
always been regarded as in pari materia.”26
C. Administrative Framework
The administrative framework for implementing these laws is also part of the
story. Throughout much of the 19th century, the administration of immigration and
naturalization laws rested with the states. But that began to change when the
Supreme Court struck down state regulation of immigration in 1875.27 By 1891, the
federal government had created the Office of the Superintendent of Immigration
within the Treasury Department.28 In 1895, the Superintendent was renamed the

22
23
24

25

26
27

28

KONVITZ, supra note 15, at 81.
See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, 239 (1952).
See Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, § 28(b), 43 Stat. 153, 154 (1924). The exclusion of
Japanese people by the 1924 law resulted in resignation of the American Ambassador to Japan, a formal
protest by the Japanese government, anti-American protests, and boycotts of American products in Japan,
but to no avail. See KONVITZ, supra note 15, at 24–25; Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922).
United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 215 (1923); see also Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, 39
Stat. 874 (1917). The 1917 law did not apply to Japanese immigrants because the Japanese government
had already limited Japanese immigration to the United States through the Gentlemen’s Agreement. See
discussion infra Part III.B.2.a. The 1917 law did not apply to Thind, who had immigrated to the United
States in 1913. See In re Thind, 268 F. 683, 683 (D. Or. 1920), rev’d, United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204,
215 (1923).
Ex parte Mohriez, 54 F. Supp. 941, 942 (D. Mass. 1944).
Chy v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (holding that state regulation of immigration from foreign nations,
to prevent arrival of paupers and criminals, was an unconstitutional intrusion on congressional power).
Immigration Act of 1891, Pub. L. No. 51-551, §7, 26 Stat. 1084, 1085 (1891).
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Commissioner-General and the office was upgraded to the Bureau of Immigration;29
in 1906, the Commissioner-General became head of a combined Bureau of
Immigration and Naturalization;30 and in 1913, two separate Bureaus were created,
with a Commissioner General of Immigration in charge of the Bureau of
Immigration, and a Commissioner of Naturalization in charge of the Bureau of
Naturalization.31 These changes established federal control over what had
previously been state administration of federal naturalization laws, in part as a
response to widespread evidence of fraudulent granting of U.S. citizenship.32
Congress also became more active, creating a Senate committee to deal with
immigration in 1889, and a House committee to deal with both immigration and
naturalization in the same year.33
D. Outline of Article
Our discussion of how bias influenced the judicial and legislative approaches
to naturalization and immigration proceeds in the following way:
Part II explains which of several approaches to statutory interpretation the
courts used to define “white.” The predominant interpretive approach was
functional textualism, which defined “white” as people who could assimilate to
American culture, a criterion that also influenced immigration law.
Part III describes the negative public reaction to different groups of
immigrants who came to the United States in the middle of the 19th and early 20th
centuries—the Irish, Chinese, Japanese, Indians, and southern and eastern
Europeans. It explains the resulting legislative, judicial, and administrative
responses that distinguished between Europeans and Asians.
I pay special attention to southern Italians because they were viewed as a
race with much the same negative characteristics as Asians—for example, as
“illiterate and ignorant in the extreme”34 who “by their votes keep our worst men in
power.”35 If this now sounds strange to us, it is because we are far removed from the
way race was understood in the early 20th century. The List of Races and Peoples
29
30
31

32
33
34
35

Act of Mar. 2, 1895, ch. 177, 28 Stat. 764, 780 (1895); IRENE BLOEMRAAD, BECOMING A CITIZEN 289 (2016).
Naturalization Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-338, § 1, 34 Stat. 596, 596 (1906).
See Act of Mar. 4, 1913, ch. 141, Pub. L. No. 62-426, § 3, 38 Stat. 736, 737. Immigration statistics were
gathered by the Department of State from 1820–1874, by the Bureau of Statistics from 1867–1895, and by
the Commissioner-General of Immigration beginning from 1895 onward. See U.S. IMMIGR. COMM’N,
ABSTRACTS OF REPORTS OF THE IMMIGRATION COMMISSION, S. Doc. No. 61-747, at 55 (3d Sess. 1910)
[hereinafter DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 1]. Although the dominant pattern in this period
was to restrict immigration, a federal statute encouraged immigration in 1869, but it did not last.
Opposition to foreign labor took firm root in 1885 with the criminalization by federal law of importing
foreign contract workers to perform labor or service of any kind. See U.S. IMMIGR. COMM’N, IMMIGRATION
LEGISLATION, S. DOC. NO. 61-758, at 34 (3d Sess. 1910) [hereinafter DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS
VOLUME 39].
U.S DEP’T OF LABOR, HISTORICAL SKETCH OF NATURALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 8–10 (1926).
DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 39, supra note 31, at 38.
See ZOLBERG, supra note 18, at 209.
Id.
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developed by the Bureau of Immigration in 1899 and picked up by the Dillingham
Commission in the first decade of the 20th century identified numerous separate
European races—for example, describing northern and southern Italians as having
very different racial characteristics.36
Part IV focuses on the different treatment of southern Italians and Indians,
both of whom encountered difficulties in assimilating to American culture. There
were two major reasons for this difference. First, as an empirical matter,
assimilation was considered harder for Indians because of their genetic makeup,
rendering them incapable of adapting to a new culture. Second, as a normative
matter, the homogeneity of the white European race in the United States had to be
protected from an influx of Asian persons of color who were not welcome as
Americans. I raise the distinct possibility that reliance on the assimilation criterion
was simply a way to give an empirical/scientific veneer to what was a racially
motivated normative preference for Europeans over Asians.
The Article concludes with a reminder that who we were is still a part of who
we are. Restrictive assumptions about who can assimilate and who ought to be an
American are as embedded in the American psyche as the inclusive ideals that we
profess. We have a better chance of attaining those ideals if we do not forget our
history.
II. INTERPRETATIVE APPROACHES TO DEFINING “WHITE”
Because the word “white” appears in the 1790 statute identifying who can
become a naturalized American citizen, the courts had to adopt a theory of statutory
interpretation to apply that term. There are two versions of intentionalism that the
courts could have used to define “white,” neither of which garnered much support.
Courts instead adopted a version of textualism—defining “white” by the function it
served in its statutory context (functionalism). As we will see in Part III, the criteria
used to answer the statutory interpretation issue—the legal meaning of “white”—
were also used to make political decisions about who could immigrate to the United
States.
A. Intentionalism; Exclusion
Everyone agrees that the intent of the 1790 law was to exclude from the
definition of “white” the only nonwhites familiar to Americans at that time. An

36

See U.S. IMMIGR. COMM’N, DICTIONARY OF RACES OR PEOPLES, S. DOC. NO. 61-662, at 82 (3d Sess. 1910)
[hereinafter DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 5]; J OEL P ERLMANN , A MERICA C LASSIFIES THE
I MMIGRANTS 29–31 (2018). The publication of the Dictionary attracted public notice. See, e.g., The
Races That Go Into the American Melting Pot, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1911, at SM2. The List was a symptom
of the late 19th and early 20th century view of racial differences, which posited that group characteristics
entered into the “blood” and did not change in response to an individual’s surroundings. PERLMANN, supra
note 36, at 404 (discussing the transmission of human difference through socialization or blood).
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exclusionary version of intentionalism would have included all others as “white,”
but most courts rejected this approach.37
B. Intentionalism; Inclusion
Another version of intentionalism would define “white” to include only
northern and western Europeans—excluding all others—because they were the
dominant groups in the 1790 United States. But that version of intentionalism was
rejected by the Supreme Court38 and was characterized as “absurd” by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals.39 Instead, courts adopted a textualist approach to defining
“white,” interpreting the statutory language to mean what its function signifies.
C. Functional Meaning; Inclusion
Textualist judges usually rely not on legislative intent, but on the functional
meaning of statutory language in context40—how the function of the statute’s text
would be understood by the relevant author and audience. For example, “pull up a
chair” could mean a dining chair, an easy chair, or an antique chair depending on
how the word functions in its factual context.41 A functionalist approach is
important because it allows the law to adapt to change occurring after the adoption
of a statute without constant legislative amendment. Thus, a “voter” who is eligible
to serve on a jury can now include women even though they could not vote when the
law on jury membership was adopted;42 a “mower” can include a more expensive
Haybine that does more than mow in a 1935 statute exempting a mower from
creditors even though Haybines postdated 1935;43 and a car can be a “carriage” in a
37

38
39
40

41
42

43

An occasional court adopted an exclusionary version of the intentionalist approach, relying on the history of
both the 1790 law and the 1875 law which reenacted the 1790 white requirement with an intent to exclude
the additional category of Chinese. See U.S. DEP’T OF COM. AND LAB., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE
DIVISION OF NATURALIZATION TO THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION 14 (1907) (stating that “[s]ome
have apparently construed section 2169 of the Revised Statutes [reenacting the 1790 law in 1875] to mean
that only Chinese, or ‘Mongolians,’ are excluded from naturalization, and that all other races are eligible.”);
U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF NATURALIZATION TO THE SECRETARY OF LABOR 7
(1916) (“practical result has now been reached by the courts that ‘white persons’ as used in [sec. 2169], means
all who are not either black persons or Mongolians.”).
United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 213–215 (1923).
United States v. Balsara, 180 F. 694, 695 (2d Cir. 1910).
See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26–27 (2001); see also
John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1958 (2011);
Tara Leigh Grove, Which Textualism?, 134 HARV. L. REV. 265, 267 (2020) (her conception of “flexible
textualism” is similar to what I call “functional textualism”). There can, of course, be disagreement about
what function is served by the statutory language. See, e.g., Wisconsin Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
2067 (2018) (the issue was whether “money remuneration” included stock options; the majority held that
“money” referred only to a “medium of exchange”; the dissent favored a broader “convertible into money”
meaning).
See In re Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090, 1092–93 (7th Cir. 1987).
See Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 14 A. 825, 829 (Pa. 1921). But see People v. Barnett, 150 N.E. 290, 292 (Ill.
1925).
See In re Erickson, 815 F.2d at 1094.
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statute exempting carriages from creditors despite the fact that the statute long
predated cars.44
This means that “white” need not be limited to those who were considered
white in 1790 (northern and western Europeans) but can include those who function
in the same way—that is, have similar political, economic, and social characteristics
as whites in 1790. Groups, therefore, become “white” by assimilating to those
characteristics even though they had not immigrated to the country by the end of
the 18th century.45 The assimilation criterion was applied differently to Asians and
Europeans. Asians were considered so unable to assimilate that they were denied
the opportunity to become naturalized as white Americans (and were also
prohibited from immigrating to the United States). Many Europeans were also
thought to have difficulties assimilating, but they were never denied the
opportunity to be naturalized and only suffered the imposition of severe
immigration quotas, not complete exclusion.
D. Color and Race
An obvious question at this point is why “white” does not refer to the
applicant’s color. The Court in Ozawa explained:
Manifestly the test afforded by the mere color of the skin of each
individual is impracticable, as that differs greatly among persons of
the same race, even among Anglo-Saxons, ranging by imperceptible
gradations from the fair blond to the swarthy brunette, the latter
being darker than many of the lighter hued persons of the brown or
yellow races. Hence to adopt the color test alone would result in a
confused overlapping of races and a gradual merging of one into the
other, without any practical line of separation.46
The Ozawa Court almost certainly had in mind the swarthy Mediterranean types
from southern and eastern Europe whose “whiteness” was nonetheless affirmed in
Thind.47
There were a few cases in which courts paid attention to an individual’s color.
A 1942 decision suggested that “when one seeking citizenship is in fact clearly not
white of skin a strong burden of proof devolves upon him to establish that he is a

44
45

46
47

Parker v. Sweet, 127 S.W. 881, 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910).
A 1917 case illustrates the functional approach, affirming the expansion of “white” to include southern and
southeastern Europeans (including the “Latin race”), beyond the inhabitants who made up the “more or less
homogeneous people” from northern Europe. See In re Singh, 246 F. 496, 498–99 (E.D. Pa. 1917). However,
the opinion fails to explain what there was about these new immigrants that assimilated them to their
European predecessors. See id.
Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 197 (1922).
See United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 213 (1923) (“The succeeding years brought immigrants from
Eastern, Southern, and Middle Europe, among them the Slavs and the dark-eyed, swarthy people of Alpine
and Mediterranean stock, and these were received as unquestionably akin to those already here and readily
amalgamated with them.”).
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white person within the meaning of the act.”48 And, conversely, there were reports
of naturalizing “persons of African descent, who are not darker than ordinary white
persons,”49 before the 1870 law explicitly authorized their naturalization.50 In
addition, an unreported case in the 1930s favored naturalization of a Parsi who
lifted up his pants leg to show that his skin was white.51 But, by and large, the
courts generalized about whether members of a group belonged to the “white” race
without examining their skin color.
The Census Bureau also generalized about whether someone was a member
of a racial group without paying attention to skin color. The categories used by the
Census Bureau reflected changes in immigration patterns. In 1860, the column
designated “color” specified the choices as “White”, “Black”, and “Mulatto”.52 In 1870
and 1880, the “color” column added ‘Chinese” and “American Indian”,53 and, in
1890, added “Japanese”,54 conflating race and color. By 1900, the heading for the
relevant column changed from “color” to “color or race,” acknowledging what had
previously been true–that “color” was a proxy for race. In 1910, the category “Other”
was added (used sometimes to refer to a Hindu),55 and, in 1920, “Filipino”, “Hindu”,
and “Korean” were added.56
In the early 1900s, the Census Bureau was confronted with the possibility of
adopting a more complex listing of “races,” by following the List of Races or Peoples
that had been developed by the Bureau of Immigration. The List was not confined
to the categories that the Census Bureau used but fine-tuned “race” to include
multiple categories of Europeans.57 The List had begun somewhat innocently as an
48
49

50

51

52
53

54

55

56

57

In re Hassan, 48 F. Supp. 843, 845 (E.D. Mich. 1942).
Douglas M. Coulson, Persecutory Agency in the Racial Prerequisite Cases: Islam, Christianity, and Martyrdom
in United States v. Cartozian, 2 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. J.L. REV. 117, 123 n.12 (2012).
See John H. Wigmore, American Naturalization and the Japanese, 28 AM. L. REV. 818, 821 (1894) (arguing
that “[i]f . . . swarthy or dark-colored [southern] Europeans are to be accepted for citizenship as ‘white’ merely
by contrast with Africans,” then both Japanese and “certain pure Hindu stocks of India” would also be
“white”).
See Sherally Munshi, “You Will See My Family Became So American”: Toward a Minor Comparativism, 63
AM. J. COMP. L. 655, 660 (2015); see also United States v. Dolla, 177 F. 101, 102 (5th Cir. 1910) (appellate
court describes the lower court’s conclusion that the applicant was “white,” based in part on the fact that the
skin on his arm which was protected from the sun was several shades lighter than the skin on his face and
hands.). “Parsi” is defined as an individual of Zoroastrian descent, who fled to India in the 7th—8th centuries
to avoid Muslim persecution in Persia. Parsi, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/Parsi (last visited May 29, 2022).
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1860 CENSUS SCHEDULE (FREDERICK DOUGLAS) (1860) (column #6).
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1870 CENSUS SCHEDULE (EMILY DICKENSON) (1870) (column #6); U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, 1880 CENSUS QUESTIONNAIRE: POPULATION (1880) (column #4).
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, CENSUS OFFICE, ELEVENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: INSTRUCTIONS TO
ENUMERATORS (1890) (instruction #4).
U.S. DEP’T OF COM. & LAB.: BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, THIRTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES:
INSTRUCTIONS TO ENUMERATORS (1910) (instruction #108).
U.S. DEPT’ OF COM. & LAB.: BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, FOURTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES:
INSTRUCTIONS TO ENUMERATORS (1920) (instruction #120).
See, e.g., DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 5, supra note 36, at 13, 25, 50, 54, 68, 79, 81, 92, 111
(list including Albanian at 13, Bulgarian at 25, Dutch at 50, English at 54, Greek at 68, Irish at 79, Italian
at 81, Magyar Hungarian at 92, and Russian at 111).
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effort to describe how different peoples might fit into the United States labor
economy, but it evolved into a catalog of more or less immutable racial traits that
were (arguably) hard-wired into the group’s gene pool and that would suggest how
well each group could assimilate into American culture.58 The List was then
published as Volume 5 of the Report of the Dillingham Commission, which was
established pursuant to the Immigration Act of 1907.59 The Commission repeatedly
urged the Census Bureau to use the List of Races and Peoples for census purposes,60
but the Census Bureau rejected the use of any question that would separately
record the European racial subdivisions recognized by the Commission, such as the
division between northern and southern Italians.61 If the census had adopted this
racial division, it might have made it easier for the public to perceive a similarity
between Indians and southern Italians, which would, in turn, have buttressed the
case for Indians being “white.”62
III. THE IMMIGRANTS: HOW THE PUBLIC AND THE LAW REACTED
Immigration in the mid-19th to early 20th centuries—from Ireland, China,
Japan, India, and southern and eastern Europe—was concerning to a nation
initially composed mostly of white northern and western Europeans. These concerns
manifested themselves both in defining the statutory term “white” and in adopting
restrictive immigration legislation.
Concerns about newcomers were not new. Benjamin Franklin feared German
immigration in the 18th century because he believed the Germans who came were
“the most stupid of their own nation.”63 He was also concerned that immigrants
brought poverty and crime.64 His definition of “white” in a 1751 essay excluded “not
only the black and ‘tawny’—Africans, Asians, and American Indians—but also
Europeans of ‘what we call a swarthy complexion’”, explicitly referencing Italians,
among others.65 Additionally, Thomas Jefferson was concerned about non-British
immigrants coming from countries with absolute monarchies, because he believed
they would bring with them an attitude toward government that was opposed to
“the freest principles of the English constitution.”66
58

59

60
61
62

63
64
65
66

See generally PERLMANN, supra note 36, at 13–40 (explaining the complex and tortuous history of the efforts
by immigration officials to compile a list of racial categories).
See Immigration Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-96, § 39, 34 Stat. 898 (1907). The Commission was established
to deflect passage of a literacy test for immigrants which was opposed by Speaker of the House Cannon. See
PERLMANN, supra note 36, at 104.
PERLMANN, supra note 36, at 133.
Id. at 133–49.
The Census Bureau made one concession. It complied with a legislative mandate to include a question in
the 1910 census about mother tongue, which bore some relationship to the races appearing in the List of
Races or Peoples because of the association of language with racial categories. See DILLINGHAM COMMISSION
REPORTS VOLUME 1, supra note 31, at 18.
MARTHA RAGSDALE, NATIONAL ORIGINS PLAN OF IMMIGRATION RESTRICTION 8 (1928).
See ZOLBERG, supra note 18, at 40–43.
See id. at 53.
See id. at 80.
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But whatever may have been the concern about European immigration at the
time of the Founding, the 1790 law did no more than require an immigrant to be
“white.”67 The only additional substantive requirement was that they be of “good
character,” a standard aimed at keeping out paupers and criminal types.68
Presumably, large-scale immigration was not seen as a major problem in this presteamship age.
In the following century, however, immigration became a politically charged
issue as new immigrants arrived from parts of Europe (Ireland and southern and
eastern Europe) and Asia (China, Japan, India). This put pressure on the courts to
decide the meaning of “white” in the 1790 naturalization law and on Congress to
decide who could immigrate to the United States.
A. Irish
There was a large increase in Irish immigration in the middle of the 19th
century, primarily because of the Potato Famine in the mid-1840s.69 Ignatiev fixes
the number at 1.8 million from 1845–1855, with many of these immigrants being
poorer than their predecessors;70 while Archdeacon records 1,374,000 Irish
immigrants from 1841–1851, with an additional number coming in from Canada.71
These figures probably explain why the 1850 census was the first to distinguish
foreign from native-born.72
Antagonism toward the Irish did not begin with the Famine in the mid1840s. Around the time of the Founding, the Federalists feared Irish immigrants
because they tended to vote for their political opponents.73 Non-English ethnic
groups had supported the Democratic-Republicans in 1796, and the Federalists
67

68

69

70
71
72

73

See Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (1790) (repealed 1795). “Whites” also had to be free,
thereby ruling out indentured laborers. Id.
See Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1; see also Jennifer Chin & Zeenat Hassan, As Respected as a Citizen
of Old Rome: Assessing Good Moral Character in the Age of National Security, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 945, 950
n.34 (2015) (noting that some representatives supported the good moral character requirement to prevent the
country from being “overrun with the outcasts of Europe”). One author suggested that, for a brief period,
naturalization may have been seen as an “instrument” for integrating people into American culture (a kind
of baptism), not as a “capstone of a process of integration,” as it later became. ZOLBERG, supra note 18, at 83.
Stephen A. Brighton, Degrees of Alienation: The Material Evidence of the Irish and Irish American Experience,
1850-1910. 42 Historical Archaeology 132, 132 (2008) (“As early as the 1820s, individuals were steadily
arriving from the west of Ireland, but the watershed for Irish dispersal to the United States was at the time
of Ireland's Great Hunger (An Gorta Mhor), beginning in 1845 and popularly known today as the Potato
Famine.”); SAMUEL P. ORTH, OUR FOREIGNERS: A CHRONICLE OF AMERICANS IN THE MAKING 107 (1921) (“But
the most potent cause of the great Irish influx into America was famine in Ireland. . . . When the cold and
damp summer of 1845 brought the potato rot, the little, overpopulated island was facing dire want. But when
the next two years brought a plant disease that destroyed the entire crop, then famine and fever claimed one
quarter of the eight million inhabitants.”)
NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE 39 (1995).
THOMAS J. ARCHDEACON, BECOMING AMERICAN 42 (1983).
See ZOLBERG, supra note 18, at 129. Irish immigration may also explain de Tocqueville’s warning in 1850 of
a “multitude of Europeans whom misfortune and misconduct drive . . . toward the shores of the new world .
. . bring[ing] to the United States our greatest vices . . . .” See id. at 126.
See ARCHDEACON, supra note 71, at 60.
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blamed their near defeat in that year on the Irish.74 A Federalist member of
Congress stated that there was no need to “invite hordes of wild Irishmen, nor the
turbulent and disorderly of all parts of the world, to come here with a view to
disturb our tranquility . . . .”75 One legislative response was a 1798 law raising the
waiting period for naturalization to 14 years.76 Ironically, anti-immigrant feelings
were a partial cause of large numbers of immigrants to seek naturalization.77
But the increase in Irish immigration associated with the Famine led to
greater friction than had previously existed. There were anti-Irish riots, one of
which occurred in 1844 as a result of Catholic objection to reading the Protestant
version of the Bible in school.78 More significantly, there was organized political
opposition. The Native American and Know Nothing parties originated as antiCatholic and anti-Irish movements.79 A major (unsuccessful) plank of the Know
Nothing Party was to lengthen the time before an immigrant could be naturalized
to 21 years.80 Although these parties had little success at the national level,81 they
thrived in many states.82 Governors and legislators of at least six states in 1855
were adherents to the Know Nothing Party (New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, Connecticut, New York, and Pennsylvania).83
Opposition to the Irish also had racial overtones.84 The Irish suffered ethnic
slurs associated with Black people; and, conversely, Black people were “smoked
Irish.”85 The Irish response was to work especially hard to separate themselves from
Black people and become “white”—an effort made more pressing because the Irish
and Black people lived and worked so close together.86 One way the Irish
established their distance from Black people was to become staunch defenders of
slavery.87 To that end, the Irish threw in their lot with the Democratic Party (the

74
75
76

77
78
79

80
81
82
83
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ZOLBERG, supra note 18, at 91–92.
IGNATIEV, supra note 70, at 65.
ARCHDEACON, supra note 71, at 60; Naturalization Act of 1798, Pub. L. No. 5-54, § 1, 1 Stat. 566, repealed by
Naturalization Law, Pub. L. No. 7-28, § 5, 2 Stat. 153 (1802).
See ZOLBERG, supra note 18, at 96.
See IGNATIEV, supra note 70, at 149–52.
See id. at 157. See generally DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 39, supra note 31, at 9–17
(discussing the Native American and Know Nothing movements). Mel Brooks captured this mid-century
hostility to the Irish in his movie BLAZING SADDLES (1974) (All right, we’ll give some land to the n****** and
the ch****, but we DON’T WANT THE IRISH.”).
ZOLBERG, supra note 18, at 151–52.
See ARCHDEACON, supra note 71, at 82.
See ZOLBERG, supra note 18, at 155–56, 165.
See TYLER ANBINDER, NATIVISM AND SLAVERY: THE NORTHERN KNOW NOTHINGS AND THE POLITICS OF THE
1850S 127 (1992).
It is also likely that anti-Irish sentiment relied in part on suspicion that Catholics would be more
deferential to the Pope than to the U.S. government; see JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS
OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860–1925 6 (1955).
IGNATIEV, supra note 70, at 41.
See id. at 41–42.
See generally id. at 6–31 (detailing the split between Irish and Irish-Americans over the issue of race).
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party of slavery), which had rejected nativist antagonism to Irish immigrants.88
Ignatiev notes that poorer Irish immigrants were especially likely to be wary of
Black people because they feared that free Black people would compete as equals in
the Northern job market.89 Irish opposition to Black people also took a violent
form;90 for example, in 1842 “a largely Irish mob in Philadelphia attacked an AfroAmerican temperance parade.”91
In the end, these observations about the Irish have more interest to the
sociologist and political scientist than to the lawyer. For census and naturalization
purposes, there was never any doubt that the Irish were “white.” There were
probably several reasons for this. First, there was no significant federal
administrative involvement in matters of naturalization until much later in the
nineteenth century.92 Second, there was no basis on which to describe the Irish as
belonging to a race other than the white race. The List of Races and Peoples, which
divided Europeans into different races, did not exist until around 1900.93 Third,
most of the Irish spoke English.94 Fourth, Henry Cabot Lodge (in the late 19th
century) noted that, unlike the new immigrants from southern and eastern Europe,
the Irish were in close geographical proximity to the English, though of different
stock.95
The way in which the Irish made use of their ability to vote as naturalized
citizens might have raised an important question about how to evaluate their
ability to assimilate. The Irish used the vote to gain political power in several big
cities, by mastering the skills of city machine politics.96 Opponents of naturalization
might have characterized this version of assimilation as a corruption of our political
system that would justify not giving the Irish the right to vote. But, conversely, bigcity political organizations could have been viewed more favorably because of the
help they provided to immigrants and the poor.97

88
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91
92
93
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See id. at 75–77.
See id. at 97–98.
See id. at 137 (providing an example of Irish laborers attacking Black workers in Philadelphia in 1842); see
also ARCHDEACON, supra note 71, at 83–84 (detailing attacks on a Black orphanage during a draft riot).
IGNATIEV, supra note 70, at 23.
See supra Part I.A.3.
See PERLMANN, supra note 36, at 32.
See id. at 58. In a similar vein, Archdeacon notes that the Irish at least had the English language.
ARCHDEACON, supra note 71, at 152. But see IGNATIEV, supra note 70, at 38–40 (claiming that many Irish
spoke only Irish and that it was a myth that their ability to speak English made their plight easier).
See DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 5, supra note 36, at 79 (“Like the English, the Irish come to
the United States speaking our own language and imbued with sympathy for our ideals and our democratic
institutions.”).
See ARCHDEACON, supra note 71, at 99–100.
See generally TERRY GOLWAY, MACHINE MADE: TAMMANY HALL AND THE CREATION OF MODERN POLITICS (2014)
(dismantling negative stereotypes of city machine politics by detailing its benefits for new immigrants and
low-income constituents).
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B. Asians
A person was “white,” as that term was used in the 1790 naturalization
statute, if they could assimilate into American culture. That standard was never
invoked to determine whether the Irish were “white,” but it played an important
role in deciding whether Asians who came to this country beginning in the second
half of the nineteenth century (Chinese, Japanese, Indians) could be naturalized.
And it also influenced the adoption of legislation preventing Asians from
immigrating to the United States.
i. Chinese
Chinese immigration was much less than Irish immigration but excited more
extreme opposition. The totals rose after the middle of the 19th century: 1850–1869
(89,961) 98; 1870–1889 (198,936) 99; 1890–1909 (35,152) 100—a total of 324,049. Other
data confirm this pattern. One tally fixes the annual average of Chinese
immigration through 1868 at 4,567. Chinese immigration then increased
dramatically in 1869–1870 to 28,614. After falling to 15,923 in the next two years, it
then peaked at 69,090 between 1873–1877.101 Another tally records an annual
average of 4,300 immigrants from 1861–1867, rising to 6,707 in 1868; 12,874 in
1869; 15,740 in 1870; and reaching new highs of 20,292 in 1873 and 22,781 in
1876.102
The demand for Chinese labor surged after the formation of the Central
Pacific Railroad in California. Despite one of the railroad founder’s concerns about
the “settlement among us of an inferior race,” profit won over prejudice, and the
Chinese were hired.103 But welcoming Chinese laborers did not mean welcoming
them as citizens. An 1868 treaty with China stated that its citizens’ entry as
laborers would not be construed as providing a right to acquire citizenship by
naturalization.104
The fact that Chinese immigration concentrated in California explains the
intense political opposition in that state.105 After the Revised Statutes of 1873
accidentally omitted the white requirement for naturalization, it was restored in
1875 in response to West Coast concerns about extending citizenship to the
“Mongolian” race.106 California had also rejected the 15th Amendment to the United
States Constitution, which prohibited the denial of a citizen’s right to vote based on
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106

DALE ANDERSON, CHINESE AMERICANS 14 (2007).
Id.
Id.
ARCHDEACON, supra note 71, at 120.
ZOLBERG, supra note 18, at 182.
See id. at 180.
See id.
PERLMANN, supra note 36, at 14.
In re Saito, 62 F. 126, 126–27 (D. Mass. 1894); see also 382 Rev. Stat. § 2169 (1875).
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race or color, because of fear that it might lead to Chinese citizenship;107 and the
defeat of an 1870 proposal to delete the requirement that only whites could be
naturalized was attributable to West Coast objections to Chinese citizenship.108
Opposition to Chinese citizenship also resulted in limiting the availability of
birthright citizenship by making it harder in the 1870s for Chinese women to come
to the United States because they might give birth to U.S. citizens.109
The restoration of the white requirement for naturalization in 1875 at the
behest of the West Coast states was a harbinger of the May 1882 federal statute
that banned immigration by Chinese laborers110 and also explicitly prohibited
Chinese from becoming naturalized citizens.111 There had been some doubt about
whether Chinese were “white” before the passage of the 1882 law. One author noted
that before the Chinese Exclusion Act expressly prohibited Chinese naturalization,
several Chinese persons were naturalized as United States citizens in New York
and North Carolina,112 and “a July 22, 1870 newspaper article recount[ed]
Massachusetts’ longstanding practice of naturalizing ‘Chinese as well as other
Asiatics’ since at least 1843.”113 But a reported 1878 United States district court
case from California held that Chinese persons were not white,114 and the 1882
legislation settled the matter.
The dominant image of Chinese persons was that they were unwilling or
unable to assimilate. This view was based mainly on experience with Chinese
“coolies,” an Anglicized version of the Chinese word for unskilled laborers.115 This
image of Chinese immigrants worked its way into judicial decisions. In upholding
the Chinese exclusion law, the Supreme Court stated:
[T]hey remained strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves,
and adhering to the customs and usages of their own country. It
seemed impossible for them to assimilate with our people, or to make
any change in their habits or modes of living. As they grew in numbers
each year the people of the coast saw, or believed they saw, in the
facility of immigration, and in the crowded millions of China, where
107
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109
110
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112
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NAJIA AARIM-HERIOT, CHINESE IMMIGRANTS, AFRICAN AMERICANS, AND RACIAL ANXIETY IN THE UNITED STATES
156 (2006).
ZOLBERG, supra note 18, at 182.
Id.
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, § 1, 22 Stat. 58. In 1884, the ban was extended to include all
Chinese people. See Act of July 9, 1884, ch. 220, § 15, 23 Stat. 115. The Chinese Exclusion Act was
periodically renewed. See Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, § 1, 27 Stat. 25 (renewing the Act for ten more years);
Act of April 29, 1902, ch. 641 §1, 32 Stat. 176 (extending the Act until otherwise provided by law). Despite
this legislation, an estimated 17,300 Chinese immigrants entered illegally through the back doors of Mexico
and Canada from 1882 to 1920. See Erika Lee, The “Yellow Peril” and Asian Exclusion in the Americas, 76
PAC. HIST. REV. 537, 543 (2007).
See Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, § 14.
See JOHN KUO WEI TCHEN, NEW YORK BEFORE CHINATOWN: ORIENTALISM AND THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN
CULTURE 1776–1882, 136, 231–32 (2001).
Coulson, supra note 49, at 123 n.12.
In re Ah Yup, 1 F. Cas. 223, 224–25 (C.C.D. Cal. 1878) (No. 104).
See ARCHDEACON, supra note 71, at 147.
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population presses upon the means of subsistence, great danger that
at no distant day that portion of our country would be overrun by
them, unless prompt action was taken to restrict their immigration.116
ii. Japanese
a. The Negative View of Japanese Immigration
Japanese immigration became significant in 1891, when it first exceeded
well after the influx of Chinese immigration. The number of Japanese
immigrants in the continental U.S. (excluding Alaska) quadrupled soon after 1900,
from around 25,000 to somewhere between 95,000 to 100,000.118 During the period
from 1900 to 1908, 136,601 Japanese immigrants arrived by sea and others came
through Canada and Mexico.119 One estimate is that upward of 37,000 immigrants
came from Hawaii between 1902 and 1908.120 Other tallies indicate a significant,
but not overwhelming, influx of Japanese immigrants: 260,492 between 1899 and
1924, and 118,872 between 1908 and 1925.121 Japanese immigrants were
concentrated on the West Coast, and in 1920, 83% were in California.122 Although
these numbers may have alarmed West Coast residents, Japanese immigration was
only 1.6% (148,729) of total U.S. immigration from 1899–1910.123
Significant opposition to Japanese immigration came from California,
where some segments of the public and members of the California legislature
favored extending the Chinese exclusion laws to Japanese immigrants.124
Congress did not pass a Japanese exclusion law, but President Theodore Roosevelt
brokered an agreement that had a similar effect for Japanese workers. The event
which precipitated the agreement was the San Francisco school board arranging
1,000,117
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Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889). In the same vein is the dissenting opinion of Justice Field
in Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 566–67 (1884). He asserted that “[the Chinese] have
remained among us a separate people . . . . Our institutions have made no impression on them during the
more than 30 years they have been in the country. . . . They do not and will not assimilate with our people;
and their dying wish is that their bodies may be taken to China for burial.” Id. (Field, J., dissenting); see
also People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 404–05 (Cal. 1854) (holding that Chinese people were “Black” and were
therefore not allowed to give evidence against a white man. The court stated that the Chinese are “a race of
people whom nature has marked as inferior, and who are incapable of progress or intellectual development
beyond a certain point . . . differing in language, opinions, color, and physical conformation; between whom
and ourselves nature has placed an impassable difference . . . .”).
ARCHDEACON, supra note 71, at 121.
U.S. IMMIGR. COMM’N, IMMIGRANTS IN INDUSTRIES, JAPANESE AND OTHER IMMIGRANT RACES IN THE PACIFIC
COAST AND ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATES, JAPANESE AND EAST INDIANS, S. DOC. NO. 61-633, 5 (3d Sess. 1910)
[hereinafter DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 23].
ARCHDEACON, supra note 71, at 121.
DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 23, supra note 118, at 6.
ARCHDEACON, supra note 71, at 118, 121.
Id. at 141.
U.S. IMMIGR. COMM’N, STATISTICAL REVIEW OF IMMIGRATION 1820-1910 AND DISTRIBUTION OF IMMIGRANTS
1850-1900, S. DOC. NO. 61-756, 45 (3d Sess. 1910) [hereinafter DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 3].
See DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 23, supra note 118, at 167–68.
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in 1906 for Asian children to be placed in a segregated school.125 This offended
Japan, and Roosevelt wanted to preserve good relations as a counter to
Russian expansion in the Far East. 126 He therefore persuaded San Francisco,
in 1907, to rescind the segregation order in exchange for which Japan entered
into what became known as the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” with the United
States (not a statute or a treaty) and agreed to deny passports to laborers
intending to enter the United States.127 In effect, the result of the Chinese
exclusion laws was achieved for Japanese laborers without legislation. 128 The
impact of the Gentlemen’s Agreement is apparent from the following annual
Japanese immigration figures. Beginning in 1893 (before the Gentlemen’s
Agreement was reached), arrivals of Japanese immigrants were as follows: 1,380
(1893); 12,626 (1900); 4,908 (1901); 5,325 (1902); 6,990 (1903); 7,771 (1904); 4,319
(1905); 5,178 (1906); and 9,949 (1907), but the numbers fell to less than 2,000 from
1909–1910 after the Gentlemen’s Agreement was reached.129
The United States government’s concern with Japanese sensibilities
contrasts with the absence of such regard for Chinese sensibilities incident to the
passage of the Chinese exclusion laws. This undoubtedly had something to do with
Japan having emerged onto the world stage with its defeat of Russia in the RussoJapanese war of 1904–1905. This was the first victory in modern times of an Asian
power over a European power and announced Japan’s arrival as a country that
could not be trifled with.
California’s opposition to Japanese immigration did not abate after the
Gentlemen’s Agreement. 130 Three state political parties in 1909 adopted
exclusion planks. Unable to persuade Congress to prevent Japanese
immigration, California adopted the California Alien Land Law in 1913, which
removed the rights of aliens to own property not protected by treaty; the idea
was that the Japanese would not come to this country if they could not own
land. 131
This dispute about how to react to Japanese immigration persisted in the
1916–1917 debate over legislation creating the Asiatic Barred Zone. This law did
not apply to Japan because the Gentlemen’s Agreement already barred Japanese
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See David Brudnoy, Race and the San Francisco School Board Incident: Contemporary Evaluations, 50 CAL.
HIST. Q. 295, 297 (1971).
See generally Masuda Hajimu, Rumors of War: Immigration Disputes and the Social Construction of
American-Japanese Relations, 1905–1913, 33 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 1, 10–16 (2009).
Yuji Ichioka, The Early Japanese Immigrant Quest for Citizenship: The Background of the 1922 Ozawa
Case, 4 AMERASIA J. 1, 5 (1977).
In addition, a 1907 law permitted the President to forbid anyone granted a passport for entry to one country
for the purpose of gaining entry to the U.S. from entering into the United States. This provision was aimed
at both Japanese and Korean workers. See DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 39, supra note 31, at
61.
DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 23, supra note 118, at 5.
See id. at 170, 173.
K ONVITZ , supra note 15, at 158–60.
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labor and more explicit legislation naming Japan would give offense.132 But some
Senators objected (without success) to delegating power over U.S. immigration to a
foreign government—which is how they viewed the Gentlemen’s Agreement—and to
worrying more about what the Japanese thought than about United States
interests.133
Although there were hints that opposition to Japanese immigration was
based in part on a fear of adverse competition from cheap Japanese labor, the
opposition ran deeper. 134 The Asiatic Exclusion League argued that the “Asiatic
races are unassimilable,”135 and admitted that its opposition was “not alone on
industrial but on racial and political grounds as well.”136 Some people were more
blunt. Congressman Church from California described Japanese people
(along with Hindus) as the “greatest plague we have in the West.”137 And
another California congressman (Curry) affirmed that the “white” and
“yellow” races were unassimilable.138 The California Attorney General
explicitly admitted that the Alien Land Law was based on “race
undesirability.” 139 Negative attitudes toward “Japanese laborers [persisted]
because of race feeling growing out of difference in color, characteristics, and
ideals,” 140 as well as “economic conflict.”141 This racial disparity “practically
forbids, when not expressed in law, marriage between [Japanese people] and
persons of the white races . . . .”142
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See 54 CONG. REC. 154, 155 (1916) (statement of Sen. Smith) (Japan had not violated the Gentlemen’s
Agreement); 54 CONG. REC. 2618 (1917) (statement of Sen. Reed) (“The Japanese citizen is now excluded by
the action of his own Government, which is not offensive to the Japanese Nation, whereas if we pass this
law we will then exclude him by our act, which will be offensive.”).
See 54 CONG. REC. 155 (1916) (statement of Sen. Works) (“By this gentlemen's agreement we have
absolutely turned over to the Japanese nation the right to say who of their subjects shall enter this country,
and we have no control over it.”). There was also an objection to worrying so much about offending Japan.
See 51 CONG. REC. 2785 (1914) (statement of Sen. Nolan) (“It occurs to me, Mr. Chairman, that the national
honor of our own people should be our first consideration, and whenever we find a menace to our public
institutions, whether it be black, brown, or yellow, we should . . . enact legislation that will protect our
people . . . and make us what we ought to be—a homogeneous people.”).
See DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 23, supra note 118, at 168–71.
Id. at 170. The extreme example of assuming that Japanese people (even citizens) cannot assimilate was
their internment during WWII. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). There is a striking
contrast between the concern about the disloyalty of U.S. citizens of Japanese ancestry during WWII and
the objection to denying naturalization of citizens of a country with which we are at war, set forth in a 1917
Report of the Commissioner of Naturalization. The Report characterizes as “unreasonable and archaic” the
exclusion of every alien from naturalization irrespective of personal merits just because they were born in a
country with which the U.S. was at war. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
NATURALIZATION TO THE SECRETARY OF LABOR 6 (1917). The more “humane” policy in keeping with the
“American principle” would be to judge unworthiness on a case-by-case basis. See id.
DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 23, supra note 118, at 171.
51 CONG. REC. 2690 (1914) (statement of Rep. Church).
See id. at 2679 (statement of Rep. Curry).
See KONVITZ, supra note 15, at 159.
DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 1, supra note 31, at 675.
Id.
Id. at 676.
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There were other less negative voices. The Japanese committed fewer
crimes than the Latin races,143 were more assimilable than the Chinese, 144
were “anxious to learn western ways,”145 went to school to learn English (more
so than southern and eastern Europeans), 146 their dress conformed to
Americans, 147 and a large number of younger Japanese people were
Christians. 148 Professor Wigmore wrote a law review article in 1894 claiming that
the Japanese were assimilable and were therefore “white,” and, thus, eligible to be
naturalized.149 He argued that the Japanese have “to-day [sic] greater affinities
with us in culture and progress and facility of social amalgamation than they have
with any Asiatic people, isolated as they are to-day [sic] from Asia in tendencies and
sympathies and isolated as they have been in racial history . . . .”150 A similar claim
was made in Ozawa’s brief in the Supreme Court:
If . . . the only argument against fitness of the Japanese for
naturalization is their non-assimilability, the argument is ended, for
it is preposterous to claim that a nation which has shown itself to have
the greatest capacity for adaptation, against whom the severest
criticism is that they are imitators, is not capable of adapting itself to
our civilization.151
The more positive image of Japanese assimilation compared to that of
Chinese assimilation suggests that there may be a subtle difference in the
type of threat Japanese immigrants were perceived to pose to some
Americans. The discussion of the Japanese people contains a hint of a
different concern—that they could become politically powerful because, as
one observer noted, their “partial adoption of American customs . . . makes them
the more dangerous as competitors.”152 In the same vein, Archdeacon notes that
reaction to the Japanese was a combination of envy and fear,153 which would
undoubtedly have been nurtured by Japan’s defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese
war. This fear recasts concern about the Japanese as an issue of political power, not
as a concern about diluting American values because they could not assimilate.
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Id. at 675.
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See id.
Id.
See id.
Wigmore, supra note 50, at 827. Wigmore’s impression of the Japanese was undoubtedly formed when he was
a professor at the Keio University in Tokyo from 1889–92. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Wigmore: The Japanese
Connection, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 10 (1981).
Wigmore, supra note 50, at 827.
Brief for Petitioner at 79, Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922).
D ILLINGHAM C OMMISSION R EPORTS V OLUME 23, supra note 118, at 167.
See ARCHDEACON, supra note 71, at 164.
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b. The Ozawa Case
As it turned out, the issue of Japanese assimilation played no role in the 1922
Supreme Court Ozawa decision denying that Japanese were “white.” In 1914,
Ozawa’s application for citizenship had been denied by the district court of Hawaii,
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified the question to the Supreme
Court.154 Ozawa had come to the United States at the age of nineteen. He was not a
laborer, which was the kind of work that led to a negative view of many Japanese
immigrants. He attended the University of Berkeley for three years and moved to
Hawaii in 1906. He ended up working as a salesclerk at one of the big five Hawaiian
sugar companies. He was a practicing Christian with no connection to Japanese
churches, schools, or organizations. He sent his children to American schools and
churches, spoke mostly English at home, educated himself in American schools, and
married a woman who was educated in the United States.155 He was, in sum, a
“paragon of an assimilated Japanese immigrant.”156
But it did not matter. Evidence of Ozawa’s assimilation as an American was
disregarded in the Court’s unanimous decision that Japanese people were not
“white.” The Court based its conclusion on a “scientific” definition of Caucasian,
which excluded Japanese.157 Relying on “science” enabled the Court to avoid
confronting the potential weakness of the argument that the Japanese were
unlikely to assimilate. It was left to the Thind case, heard by the Supreme Court in
the following year, to make explicit that popular common understanding about
assimilation was the test for defining “white,” without regard to “scientific” racial
categories.158 This two-pronged approach was convenient for those determined to
exclude Asians. “Science” prevented Japanese who might be good at assimilating
from being “white,” and when “science” favored labeling Caucasian Indians as
“white,” the Court shifted to the “popular understanding” criterion for defining
“white,” yielding the same “non-white” label for Indians.
One consequence of the Ozawa decision was that Japanese immigration was
forbidden by a 1924 law that forbid immigration by anyone not eligible to become a
citizen.159 By 1924, therefore, Japanese and Chinese people were treated alike—
denied the opportunity both to immigrate and to become naturalized. There were
objections by the Japanese government and by Japanese consumers to adverse
154
155
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See Ozawa v. Unites States, 4 D.Haw. 671 (1916); Ozawa, 260 U.S. at 189–90.
Ichioka, supra note 127, at 10–11. Ozawa was born in 1875 and came to the United States in 1894. Id.
Additional details on Ozawa’s life can be found in the Densho Encyclopedia. DENSHO ENCYCLOPEDIA,
HTTPS://ENCYCLOPEDIA.DENSHO.ORG/OZAWA_V._UNITED_STATES/ (last updated April 16, 2014): Ozawa was
fluent in English; was a practicing Christian; and (he argued) his skin was as white or whiter than the
average Caucasian. See also Devon W. Carbado, Yellow by Law, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 633 644, 645 (2009).
Ichioka, supra note 127, at 11. Not every Japanese immigrant bought into Ozawa’s implicit assumption of
white superiority, based on his ability to assimilate. An article in the Japanese immigrant press stated that
“[s]ince this newspaper did ‘not believe whites are the superior race,’ it was ‘delighted’ the high tribunal ‘did
not find the Japanese to be free white persons.’” LÓPEZ, supra note 12, at 85.
LÓPEZ, supra note 12, at 85.
See infra text accompanying notes 241–43.
See Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, § 13(c), 43 Stat. 153 (1924).
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treatment by the 1924 law, which were unavailing.160 The Japanese Ambassador’s
statement—“I realize, as I believe you do, the grave consequences which the
enactment of the measure retaining that particular provision would inevitably bring
. . . ”161—was interpreted as a “veiled threat” to the United States that could not be
tolerated.162 According to the Densho Encyclopedia, a number of people from
California were behind the 1924 Act's anti-Japanese provision, including a former
publisher of a Sacramento newspaper, a former California senator, and the
California Attorney General.163 Opponents of Japanese immigration characterized
the Japanese as unassimilable and as a menace to California's Anglo-Saxon
civilization.164 Others expressed economic concerns that the Japanese “naturally
make more dangerous competitors in an economic way.”165 The Japanese were also
accused of violating the Gentlemen’s Agreement.166 By 1924, the concern with
Japanese sensibilities that had existed in the first two decades of the twentieth
century had dissipated in the xenophobia that followed WWI.
iii. Indians
a. The Negative View of Indian Immigration
The number of Indian immigrants was small. From 1899–1910 they
numbered 5,786, only .10% of total immigration, compared to 1.6% for Japanese.167
There were 9 Indian immigrants in 1900; 258 in 1904; 1,710 in 1908; and 1,782 in
1910.168 But some people thought that the increasing numbers sounded an alarm.169
The Dictionary of Races or Peoples, under the “Hindu” heading, stated that the
“immense population of India [is] beginning to arouse some concern.”170 Moreover,
opponents of Indian immigration placed a much higher estimate of the numbers of
Indians in the country than were officially reported. Congressman Church put the
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See The Senate’s Declaration of War, JAPAN TIMES AND MAIL (Apr. 19, 1924),
http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5077 (describing the Japanese response to the adverse treatment by the
United States as a “humiliating” wound that “will hurt and rankle for generations and generations”).
65 CONG. REC. 6074 (1924) (letter read aloud from Japanese Embassy written by Masanao Hanihara).
See MASAYO DUUS, THE JAPANESE CONSPIRACY: THE OAHU SUGAR STRIKE OF 1920 306 (1999) (“[T]he House
and the Senate suggested that ‘grave consequences’ amounted to a veiled threat by the Japanese
government, and the furor became front page news in papers around the country.”).
Shiho Imai, Immigration Act of 1924, DENSHO ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://encyclopedia.densho.org/Immigration_Act_of_1924/ (last updated Mar. 19, 2013).
Id.
ROGER DANIELS, THE POLITICS OF PREJUDICE 99 (1999).
Japanese Immigration: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Immigr. & Naturalization, 66th Cong., Part 1 at
715 (1920).
DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 3, supra note 123, at 45.
Id. at 348.
See id. at 325.
DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 5, supra note 36, at 75.
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number at 30,000,171 probably adding many illegal entrants. There was obviously
enough fear of Indian immigration to lead the Japanese and Korean Exclusion
League to change its name to the Asiatic Exclusion League and to spawn antiIndian riots in two Washington cities.172 The League warned that Japanese
“immigration had mushroomed” from small numbers, implying that there was a
similar risk of Indian immigration.173
It was not surprising that the concerns came primarily from the West Coast,
where Indians, Chinese, and Japanese workers clustered. The Dillingham Report
contains the following statements: “The East Indians on the Pacific coast are almost
universally regarded as the least desirable race of immigrants thus far admitted to
the United States. In point of desirability they are placed far below the Japanese,
Chinese, and other oriental races found in the Western States”;174 and “the people of
the coast States as a whole are opposed to such immigration, and the force and
validity of their objections are recognized.” 175 As a response to these concerns, the
Dillingham Report made a proposal, based on the Japanese precedent of the
Gentleman’s Agreement, that “[a]n understanding should be reached with the
British Government whereby East Indian laborers would be effectively prevented
from coming to the United States.”176
The Dillingham Report also contained multiple references to specific negative
traits that characterized the Indian population, providing a level of detail absent in
the case of the Japanese people. Specific negative traits mentioned included the
following:
Literacy: There was more illiteracy among Indians than any other immigrant
race.177
Becoming a public charge: Indians were likely to become public charges.178
Immorality: Indian Muslims were polygamists.179
Disease: Hindus would bring diseases such as hookworm.180 Comments about
lack of hygiene also suggested a concern about disease. Statements such as the
following: they use dirty blankets, do not wash clothes, and have unclean habits.181
Living conditions: Their living conditions kept them apart from others. They
had no family life because their wives were left at home, and they all slept in the
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See Restriction of Immigration of Hindu Laborers: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Immigr. &
Naturalization, 63rd Cong. 37–64, Part II at 74 (1914) [hereinafter 1914 Hindu Immigration Hearings].
Hess, supra note 17, at 61.
See Hess, supra note 17, at 61–62.
DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 23, supra note 118, at 349.
DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 1, supra note 31, at 41.
Id. at 47.
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same room.182 They were “unfit for American citizenship” because they were “single,
unskilled male laborers . . . uninterested in assimilation.”183 Their standard of living
was lower than others; they lacked furniture, slept on the floor or ground, and ate
without plates, knives, or forks.184
Appearance: Indians looked different (“strange appearance”), which
(presumably) would have made social and economic assimilation difficult.185 Most of
them were Sikhs who wore turbans and had beards.186
Concerns about Indian immigrants were expressed not only by the
Dillingham Commission but also in the 1914 Hindu Immigration Hearings.187 The
specific subject was a proposed Hindu Exclusion Bill, modeled after the Chinese
Exclusion Act.188 The fact that committee hearings were devoted specifically to
Indian immigration indicates a concern that exceeded what the numbers might
justify as well as the influence that west coast legislators had in Congress.
There was significant variation in the testimony at the hearings. They began
with testimony from a high caste Hindu, Sudhindra Bose,189 who spoke explicitly
about the issue of assimilation, explaining how Hindus fit well into American
society. He testified that Indians were educated and bathed religiously, very few
became public charges, they were ethnically Aryans and not as clannish as Chinese
and Japanese, and English was spoken because it was the common language of
Indians from different places in India.190 He acknowledged that assimilation would
take a while, but that such was true of all social adjustments.191
Subsequent testimony was far less favorable to Indians. The CommissionerGeneral of Immigration argued for exclusion, stating that the Pacific Coast Indian
workers were not as described by Bose.192 He acknowledged that the number of
Indian immigrants was not at present very high, but he feared a developing
emergency.193 Many Indians were using entry from a foreign country other than
their country of origin to obtain entry to the United States.194
Extensive negative testimony about Indians was presented by Church, a
Congressman from the State of California: disease was a major problem; they were
dirty and did not bathe; they were criminals; they were weak in English; they
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dressed differently; and intermarriage was impossible.195 As for wage competition,
Indians low-bid American workers.196 More vituperatively, he stated: “You can not
[sic] imagine anything more strange as a human being than a Hindu.”197 When a
questioner asked whether both a professor and a rural Indian worker could be
naturalized, hinting at the distinction between those Indians who could and could
not assimilate, Church stated: “They all look alike to me. I can not [sic] see any
difference between them in any way.”198 A second Indian witness at the hearings
was equally negative although less vicious. He argued that all Indians should be
eligible for naturalization because they were Caucasians, but lower caste Hindus
could not assimilate and should be excluded from immigrating by requiring a
literacy test that they could not pass.199
Church further elaborated on his critique of Indians in statements recorded
in the 1914 Congressional Record when Congress was considering a literacy
requirement for immigrants: “[Hindus] are an odd, inferior people, bound down by
strange traditions and religious fanaticisms. They ever present the appearance of
slothfulness, stupidity, and pity.”200 And, in the run-up to the Asiatic Barred Zone
Act,201 adopted in 1917, there were further statements by members of Congress
explaining why various groups, including Indians, did not belong in this country. As
for assimilation by the “brown” races generally:
It is established that the brown and black races do not amalgamate
with the white but remain identically the same as when they are put
into this melting pot or smelting pot. They do not amalgamate; they
do not “smelt”; and therefore they are undesirable elements in the
composition of our population.202
As for Indian assimilation in particular:
The people of India . . . are as unlike us as is the foliage of the tropics
unlike that of the Temperate Zone, and their civilization, their habits
of thought can no more be transformed into the habits and thoughts
of the people of the Occident than the tropic vegetation can be made
to grow at the Arctic Circle. . . . [T]he religion which they believe, the
castes which they acknowledge, the family life which they employ, all
exist in their country because it was the natural flower and fruitage
195
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See 1914 Hindu Immigration Hearings, supra note 171, Part II at 70–78, 82.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 83.
Id. at 85.
See 1914 Hindu Immigration Hearings, supra note 171, Part V at 159–60. Accuracy was not this witness’s
strong suit, mischaracterizing the caste system. For example, he labelled Kshatriyas as merchants; in fact,
they were warriors. See Jeremy Sarkin & Mark Koenig, Ending Caste Discrimination in India, 41 GEO. WASH.
INT’L L. REV. 541, 547 (2010). He labelled Sudras as warriors; in fact, they were one rung above untouchables.
See id. He also got the caste rank order wrong: he ordered castes as Brahmin, Sudra, Kshatriya and Vaishya;
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51 CONG. REC. 2690 (1914) (statement of Rep. Church).
See Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875–78 (repealed 1952).
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of their hearts and souls. . . . They can no more appreciate a
government like ours, or a civilization such as ours, than we can
appreciate theirs. They can no more transform themselves into
creatures of the Occident than we can make ourselves into children of
the Orient.203
And, finally, there was this comment about the risk of mongrelization by inferior
races, including darker races of the Orient, conflating the issues of immigration and
naturalization:
I am most heartily in favor of prohibiting . . . the immigration into this
country of any people, any race, the amalgamation of which with the
white race will tend to lower the standard of manhood and
womanhood. . . . I think . . . that the decadence of the civilizations of
the past has been in a large measure due to the amalgamation of
superior and inferior races. Nothing could be more undesirable in
America than the encouragement of the multiplication of the mongrel
in this country. . . . I do not want to vitiate the pure Caucasian blood
of America with the blood of the darker races of the Orient . . . . If I
had my way about it, I would not permit any but the Caucasian races
to enjoy the privileges of citizenship in America.204
These negative observations about Asians in general and Indians, in
particular, resulted in the adoption of the Asiatic Barred Zone Act in 1917.
One Senator said that the statute’s use of latitude and longitude to define the
Barred Zone was to cover islands near the coast of Asia,205 but it was clear that
barring Indians was the true objective.206 The wording of the 1917 law avoided
explicitly naming Hindus because a geographical test was a more diplomatic way of
achieving the same result.207 Although the Act avoided taking sides on whether
Indians were “white,” which at the time was legally unclear,208 the Act provided
important political context for the Supreme Court’s 1923 judicial decision that
Indians were not “white.”209
203
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See United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 215 (1923) (“[The 1917 Act] not only constitutes conclusive
evidence of the congressional attitude of opposition to Asiatic immigration generally but is persuasive of a
similar attitude toward Asiatic naturalization as well, since it is not likely that Congress would be willing
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Thind, who had immigrated to the United States in 1913. See In re Thind, 268 F. 683, 683 (D. Or. 1920).
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b. The Administrative and Legal Background of the Thind Case
Notwithstanding the 1917 Act, plaintiff Thind might have had some reason
for optimism based on the statement in the 1922 Ozawa decision that there would
be borderline cases between those who were clearly white or nonwhite,210 especially
when the government’s brief conceded that Thind fell in that middle zone.211 Thind
might also have been optimistic that he would be considered “white” because of
existing administrative and legal precedent.
First, administrative action was not entirely consistent. Although a casual
perusal of census records appears to label most Indians as “Hin”(du), a number of
Indians named Singh were labeled “W”—for example: in 1910, Javalla Singh, Lakha
Singh, and Sinder Singh; and, in 1920, Manghe Singh. 212
There was also evidence that the agency making naturalization decisions
sometimes favored an Indian applicant. A 1913 comment by the Commissioner of
Naturalization stated that a clerk charged with the responsibility to certify an
applicant for naturalization would yield to a Hindu applicant who insisted that he
was white: “[because the clerk] can not [sic] anticipate the action of the court in
such a case, there remains nothing for him to do beyond explaining to the applicant
the grounds of his doubt, and accepting the petition if the applicant is insistent.”213
Second, before the Supreme Court decided the Thind case in 1923, there was
considerable judicial uncertainty about how to classify someone as “white.”214 The
legal divide was between a “scientific” meaning (Caucasian) and popular common
understanding, based on the functional meaning of the statutory word “white”
(ability to assimilate).215 According to López, in cases involving Indians from 1909
until the 1923 Supreme Court decision in Thind,216 three decided that Indians were
“white” because they were Caucasian,217 one decided that they were “white” based
on the weight of precedent,218 and one relied on common speech to decide that they
were not “white.”219 In addition, Hess reports that about seventy Indians were
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naturalization and instead concluded that Arabians were members of the white race).
See infra text accompanying notes 216–32.
See supra text accompanying notes 40–45 (discussing a functional approach).
See LÓPEZ, supra note 12, at 203–07.
See United States v. Balsara, 180 F. 694, 695 (2d Cir. 1910); In re Mozumdar, 207 F. 115, 117 (E.D. Wash.
1913); In re Singh, 257 F. 209, 212 (S.D. Cal. 1919).
See In re Thind, 268, 684 F. 683 (D. Ore. 1920), rev’d, United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 215 (1923).
See In re Singh, 246 F. 496, 498–500 (E.D. Pa. 1917) (not “white”).
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naturalized because their Aryan background was the same as Europeans, despite
opposition from the federal attorney general.220
Indians were not the only group whose racial category was uncertain. There
were seven pre-Thind decisions that involved Syrians; four held that they were
“white”, and three ruled that they were not “white”.221
Turks were also on the brink of “whiteness.” A 1909 newspaper report states
that a number of Turks employed in Indiana factories had been naturalized.222 And
another newspaper report states that a federal District Court judge in Rhode Island
admitted Jacob Thompson, a
. . . ‘subject of the Sultan of Turkey and a native of Armenia,’ to
citizenship over the government's objection, stating that ‘it has been
the practice of this court for many years to recognize . . . Turks as
coming within the designation of free white persons, and the court will
continue so to consider them until a court of higher authority decides
otherwise.’223
In 1909, after the Chief of the Naturalization Division of the Bureau of
Immigration and Naturalization claimed that “Turks, peoples of the Barbary states
and Egypt, Persians, Syrians, and ‘other Asiatics’” were not “white,” that
interpretation was almost immediately withdrawn when it met vigorous objection
not only from the Ottoman Empire but also from the State Department and the
Department of Justice. 224 Secretary of Commerce and Labor, Charles Nagel, wrote
that he had taken immediate steps to ensure “a discontinuance of any aggressive
measures” by the Government against these groups.225
Even Japanese people might be “white.” Although four cases after 1909
decided that Japanese people were not white,226 they did not tell the whole story. A
court noted that previously, East Asians were sometimes naturalized as “white”
persons by census takers and courts.227 According to Ichioka, as late as the 1910
census, there were 420 naturalized citizens of Japanese descent.228 And the
220
221

222

223
224

225
226

227

228

See Hess, supra note 17, at 65.
See In re Najour, 174 F. 735, 736 (N.D. Ga. 1909) (“white”); In re Mudarri, 176 F. 465, 466 (C.C.D. Mass.
1910) (“white”); In re Ellis, 179 F. 1002, 1003–04 (D. Or. 1910) (“white”); Dow v. United States, 226 F. 145,
148 (4th Cir. 1915) (“white”); Ex parte Shahid, 205 F. 812, 816 (E.D.S.C. 1913) (dictum that Syrians were
not “white”); Ex parte Dow, 211 F. 486, 490 (E.D.S.C. 1914) (not “white”), rev’d 226 F. 145 (4th Cir. 1915); In
re Dow 213 F. 355, 366–67 (E.D.S.C. 1914) (not “white”), rev’d, 226 F. 145 (4th Cir. 1915).
See DOUG COULSON, RACE, NATION, AND REFUGE: THE RHETORIC OF RACE IN ASIAN AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP
CASES 218 n.40 (2017).
Id.
Coulson, supra note 49, at 157–58; see also People v. Elyea, 14 Cal. 144, 146 (Cal. 1859) (reasoning that
Turks were Caucasian and could therefore serve as a witness in cases involving a white person, an
opportunity not afforded to Chinese).
Coulson, supra note 49, at 158.
See Bessho v. United States, 178 F. 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1910); In re Kumagai, 163 F. 922, 924 (W.D. Wash.
1908); In re Yamashita, 70 P. 482, 483 (Wash. 1902); In re Saito, 62 F. 126, 126 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894).
See In re Halladjian, 174 F. 834, 843–44 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909) (“At one time . . . Japanese were deemed to be
white, but are not usually so reckoned today.”).
Ichioka, supra note 127, at 2 (citing U.S. Bureau of the Census data).
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government’s reply brief in Ozawa concedes that prior to 1909 “Japanese were
naturalized by many courts,” even though several court cases were to the
contrary.229
The pre-Thind treatment of Parsis also reflected uncertainty about how to
categorize Indians. Parsis came to India after the Muslim conquest of Persia in the
seventh century CE.230 Before Thind, a 1909 court decision allowed a Parsi to be
naturalized but expected doubts about the relevant criteria to be resolved on appeal;
231 an appellate court then held that a Parsi was white.232
c. The Thind Case
Thind must have been encouraged about his chances of being “white” when a
lower court granted him citizenship, relying on precedent.233 Thind might also have
hoped that a court would rely on his individual characteristics,234 which suggested
assimilation into American culture, rather than take an all-or-nothing approach to
determine whether someone was “white” based on group membership. For example,
a court might have considered the following: (1) his very American work and
educational background (he had immigrated to the United States in 1913 and began
working summers in Oregon lumber mills to pay his way through school at UC
Berkeley)235; (2) his patriotism (he enlisted in the army in 1917 and was honorably
discharged in 1918)236; and (3) his status as a high-caste Hindu.237
But the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the lower court, and Thind
was stripped of his citizenship.238 The Court disregarded his individual traits, which
was consistent with the judicial practice of relying on generalizations about group

229
230

231
232

233
234

235
236
237

238

Reply Brief for the United States, supra note 211, at 4, Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922).
See Zoroastrianism, THE HIST. CHANNEL, https://www.history.com/topics/religion/zoroastrianism (Oct. 8,
2019).
See In re Balsara, 171 F. 294, 295 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909), aff’d 180 F. 694 (2d Cir. 1910).
See United States v. Balsara, 180 F. 694, 696 (2d Cir. 1910). The post-Thind treatment of Parsis was also
murky. A 1939 case held that a Parsi was not “white” because he was like the Hindu “in the mind of the
common man,” following Thind. See Wadia v. United States, 101 F. 2d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1939). But an
unreported decision after Thind favored Dinshah Ghadiali, a Parsi whose revocation of U.S. citizenship was
threatened in 1932. See Munshi, supra note 51, at 656. At trial, he lifted up his pant leg to show white color.
See id. at 660. Ghadiali won his case but it was never officially reported. See id. We know about him only
because he wrote about his ordeal in Dinshah Naturalization Case Clearing Contested Citizenship. See id.
See In re Thind, 268 F. 683, 684 (D. Ore. 1920), rev’d, United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 215 (1923).
There was an occasional suggestion that relying on individual traits was the better way of determining who
should be eligible for naturalization. See KONVITZ, supra note 15, at 32.
Bhaghat Singh Thind, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/rootsinthesand/i_bhagat1.html.
In re Bhaghat Singh Thind, 268 F. 683, 683–84 (D. Ore. 1920).
See United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 210 (1923) (though he was a Sikh, the Court labelled him a
Hindu).
Thind was eventually granted citizenship in New York in 1936, see Tanveer Kalo, Dr. Bhagat Singh Thind,
THE U.S. WORLD WAR I CENTENNIAL COMMISSION, https://www.worldwar1centennial.org/index.php/indianswho-served/1940-dr-bhagat-singh-thind.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2020), because of a law allowing
citizenship for WWI veterans regardless of race.
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characteristics.239 When courts described an applicant’s individual traits, they
usually went on to lament having to deny naturalization based on group
membership.240
In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court rejected reliance on Thind
being a Caucasian (a “scientific” category) but instead relied on the “popular
meaning” of the word “white,” as follows:
In the endeavor to ascertain the meaning of the statute we must not
fail to keep in mind that it does not employ the word “Caucasian,” but
the words “white persons,” and these are words of common speech and
not of scientific origin . . . [I]n this country, during the last half century
especially, the word by common usage has acquired a popular
meaning, not clearly defined to be sure, but sufficiently so to enable us
to say that its popular as distinguished from its scientific application
is of appreciably narrower scope. It is in the popular sense of the word
. . . that we [use] as an aid to the construction of the statute, for it
would be obviously illogical to convert words of common speech used
in a statute into words of scientific terminology when neither the
latter nor the science for whose purposes they were coined was within
the contemplation of the framers of the statute or of the people for
whom it was framed. The words of the statute are to be interpreted in
accordance with the understanding of the common man from whose
vocabulary they were taken.241
Once the Court had focused on the popular meaning of the statutory language, it
was a short step to the conclusion that the word “white” referred to the public’s
perception of a group’s potential for assimilation. The government’s brief had been
explicit on this point, to the disadvantage of Indians: “[A]t the time the first
naturalization law was passed the Hindus were regarded as a people wholly alien to

239

240

241

But see In re Balsara, 171 F. 294, 295 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909) (admitting a Parsi to citizenship, based on his
“high character and exceptional intelligence”), aff’d, United States v. Balsara, 180 F. 694, 696 (2d Cir.
1910).
A list of such cases appears in Charles Gordon, The Racial Barrier to American Citizenship, 93 U. PA. L.
REV. 237, 246 n.47 (1945). Some individual traits were, by law, an independent reason for denying
naturalization, even if the applicant was “white.” Id. The annual reports of the Commissioner of
Naturalization include immoral character and ignorance (probably referencing an understanding of our
government system) as among those reasons. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF NATURALIZATION TO THE SECRETARY OF LABOR 6 tbl. 6 (1921) (showing that in 1921, 719
immigrants were denied naturalization based on immoral character and 1,120 were denied naturalization
based on ignorance); see also Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214 (barring those likely to
become a public charge). Individualized tests may have had a greater negative impact on applicants whose
status as “white” was unclear. For example, a 1913 case denied naturalization to a Syrian based on the
applicant’s character traits. Ex parte Shahid, 205 F. 812, 816–17 (E.D.S.C. 1913). The court stressed that
the applicant was a polygamist, a disbeliever in organized government, did not speak English, and was “not
one the admission of whom to citizenship is likely to be for the benefit of the country.” Id. at 812–13, 816–
17.
Thind, 261 U.S. at 208–09.
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Western civilization and utterly incapable of assimilation to Western habits and
customs, mode of life, political and social institutions.242
And the Thind Court followed the lead of the government’s brief, rejecting the
notion of Indian assimilation (in contrast to the notion of assimilation by
Europeans):
It is a matter of familiar observation and knowledge that the physical
group characteristics of the Hindus render them readily
distinguishable from the various groups of persons in this country
commonly recognized as white. The children of English, French,
German, Italian, Scandinavian, and other European parentage,
quickly merge into the mass of our population and lose the distinctive
hallmarks of their European origin. On the other hand, it cannot be
doubted that the children born in this country of Hindu parents would
retain indefinitely the clear evidence of their ancestry.243
One might have thought that Thind’s army service would have influenced the
Court and especially Justice Sutherland, who wrote the opinion in Thind. In 1907,
Sutherland had argued that his Mormon colleague should be seated as a Senator
from Utah over the objections of those opposed to Utah in general and polygamy in
particular.244 As for potentially offensive habits, he argued that these would be
discarded as Mormons embraced progressive modernity; Mormons were capable of
change.245 He reminded his listeners that Christians had done as much when they
let go of their concerns about witchcraft.246 And he explicitly cited Mormon military
service as evidence that Mormons sacrificed in common with other Americans.247
But when it came to Indians in 1923, the possibility that they could change did not
arise, and Sutherland did not even mention Thind’s military service.248
The Court strongly denied a racist foundation for its conclusion, stating: “[i]t
is very far from our thought to suggest the slightest question of racial superiority or
inferiority. What we suggest is merely racial difference, and it is of such character
and extent that the great body of our people instinctively recognize it and reject the
thought of assimilation.”249 In this respect, the Court echoed the government’s brief
expressing “full appreciation of the wonderful civilization of the Far East . . . which
may possibly be in existence if and when our Western civilization shall wane” and

242
243
244

245
246
247
248
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Brief for the United States, supra note 211, at 14.
Thind, 261 U.S. at 215.
Victor Jew, George Sutherland and American Ethnicity: A Pre-History to Thind and Ozawa, 41 CENTENNIAL
REV. 553, 557 (1997).
Id. at 558–59.
Id. at 559.
Id. at 558.
But the lower court decision in Thind, holding that the applicant was “white,” did mention his army service.
In re Thind, 268 F. 683, 684 (D. Ore. 1920), rev’d, United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 215 (1923).
In re Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 215 (1923).
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which “enjoyed a literature and art which, in some respects, have not yet been
surpassed in our somewhat arrogant Western civilization.”250
This denial of racism was an obvious attempt to unlink the view that the
people seeking citizenship were unlikely to assimilate from the view that they were
inferior. But it is unconvincing. If the criterion for “whiteness” is “popular
meaning,” public perception should be what matters, not what the Court thinks
about the quality of Indian civilization. And the public perception was that Indians
were a decidedly inferior race,251 at least to those on the West Coast who figured
prominently in the 1914 hearings about Hindu immigration and in the committee
deliberations leading up to the 1917 Asiatic Barred Zone statute.252
There was another way that a court could have decided to grant Thind
citizenship, falling between individualized and all-or-nothing approaches. Courts
might have defined a subgroup within a racial category as white without allowing
or denying everyone in the broader category to qualify. There was a plausible
precedent for doing this in the famous Holy Trinity case, which dealt with an 1885
statute prohibiting someone from bringing contract labor into the country for “labor
or service of any kind.”253 The Court held that this broad category did not include
“brain toilers,”254 thereby dividing “labor or service” into “higher” and “lower”
subcategories. Thus, the fact that Thind was a high-caste Hindu might have
justified concluding that this subgroup deserved the label “white.” Another Indian
(Mozumdar) made a similar claim when he described himself as a high-caste Hindu
of pure blood (an Aryan), belonging to the warrior caste, kept pure by rigid rules of
exclusion regarding marriage. He contrasted himself with those Indians who
performed rough manual labor, who were an entirely separate class, having quite a
different religion and a different ancestry.255
The discussion of Hindus in the Dictionary of Races or Peoples also provided
some support for the “subgroup” approach when it described some northern Indians
250

251

252

253

254
255

Brief for the United States, supra note 211, at 21. There is a strong hint of “Orientalism” in this
appreciation of Indian civilization. In the nineteenth century, this took the form of praise for Indian
spiritualism (apparent in the writings of Emerson and Thoreau), contrasted with Western materialism. See
VIJAY PRASHAD, THE KARMA OF BROWN FOLK, 15–20 (2000).
The link between a negative view of a racial group and the possibility of citizenship was also clear in the
infamous 1857 case, Dred Scott v. Sandford, which decided that persons of African descent (whether slave
or free) could not be citizens because they were “subordinate and inferior.” 60 U.S. 393, 404–05 (1857).
A 1942 case suggested that the public perception of Indians might have changed, questioning whether
Indians would still be considered nonwhite if the Supreme Court were to revisit the issue. Samras v. United
States, 125 F.2d 879, 881–82 (9th Cir. 1942). The petitioner brought a test case for the Supreme Court to
reverse Thind and decide that Indians were “white.” See id. The Court of Appeals stated that it could not
overrule Thind, but “[w]e believe that with the present changed personnel of the United States Supreme
Court it is entirely possible that they may reconsider their decision in the Thind case and depart therefrom
and hold that natives of India (Hindus) are ‘white’ persons within the spirit and meaning of the statute.” Id.
“Before his appeal could be heard, Samras was drafted into the United States Army, which automatically
entitled him to citizenship” under the law at that time. Hess, supra note 17, at 72.
Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458 (1892) (interpreting Alien Contract Labor Law of 1895. Feb.
26, 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332).
Id. at 463–64.
In re Mozumdar, 207 F. 115, 116 (E.D. Wash. 1913).
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as good merchants and noted that “perhaps [they] identify themselves with western
civilization to a greater degree than do the Chinese.”256 The Dictionary went on to
distinguish the southern Dravidians, “many of them extremely low in civilization
and approaching the Negro in physical characteristics,” with the Aryan Hindus of
the north, who are “more closely related in language, if not physical appearance, to
our northern Europeans”.257 It would not have been too much of a stretch to hold
that at least high-caste Hindus were “white,” but not Indians belonging to other
castes. But those responsible for labeling whites were not inclined to separate
members of a group into subgroups. In a different context—the debate over the 1924
Immigration bill—Senator Reed of Pennsylvania was unwilling to divide Italians
into subgroups.258 He stated that “[a]s a matter of common-sense legislation . . . we
have to treat the people in what is now known as Italy as one group . . . .”259
Consequently, Italians were not classified based on their origins in different parts of
Italy prior to Italian unification in 1861, missing an opportunity to treat northern
and southern Italians differently.260
C. Southern and Eastern Europeans
Asian immigration was a drop in the bucket compared to the increase in
immigration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During the
decade before 1880, total immigration peaked at 2,812,191.261 Thereafter, the totals
ballooned: 1881–1890 (5,246,613); 1891–1900 (3,687,564); 1901–1910, (8,795,386);
1911–1920 (5,735,811).262 The major contributors to this increase were immigrants
from southern and eastern Europe, who were referred to as the “new
immigra[nts].”263 In 1907 alone, total immigration was 1,285,349; the number from
Europe was 1,207,619, 81% of which came from southern and eastern Europe;
twenty-five years earlier, Europe immigration had been 648,186, of which only
13.1% (84,973) came from southern and eastern Europe.264 The following data show
the dramatic shift in the percentage contribution to U.S. immigration from northern
and western Europe (NW) to southern and eastern Europe (SE):
DECADE
PERCENTAGE OF IMMIGRATION
1871–1880:
1881–1890:
256
257
258
259
260

261
262
263
264

NW, 73.6%;
NW, 72%;

SE, 7.2%
SE, 18.3%

DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 5, supra note 36, at 53.
Id. at 75–76.
68 CONG. REC. 5462 (statement of Sen. Reed).
Id.
See Robert Orsi, The Religious Boundaries of an Inbetween People: Street Feste and the Problem of the DarkSkinned Other in Italian Harlem, 1920-1990, 44 AM. Q. 313, 315 (1992) (pointing out that Italians south of
Rome had little identification with the newly formed Italian state).
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 56 (1948).
Id.
See DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 1, supra note 31, at 13.
Id.
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1891–1900:
1901–1910:
1911–1920:
1920–1930:

NW, 44.6%;
NW, 21.7%;
NW, 17.4%;
NW, 31.2%;
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SE, 51.9%
SE, 70.8%
SE, 59%
SE, 29.1%265

The Dillingham Report states that this shift in the makeup of immigrants
was creating “a widespread feeling of apprehension as to its effect on the
economic and social welfare of the country,” based on the following concerns
expressed that were similar to those expressed about Asian immigrants.266
The old immigrants quickly assimilated; they mingled freely, and their
racial identity was entirely lost for their children, but the new immigrants
were segregated “apart from Native Americans and older immigrants,"
slowing their assimilation.267 They were either single or came without their
wives and lived in crowded groups.268 The old immigrants were essentially
permanent settlers, but about 40% of the new immigrants returned to their
country of origin, and two-thirds of that 40% stayed there.269 The
Dillingham Report asserted that new immigrants were less intelligent than
their predecessors; of those over age 14, one-third were illiterate, and they
brought disease, crime, and pauperism.270
This apprehension led to a renewed embrace of Know-Nothingism. The man
who was soon to become the Commissioner-General of Immigration wrote as follows
about the new immigrants: “Whatever Know-Nothingism meant in former years, a
man who advocates a restriction of immigration today is a patriot . . . . The
population that came previous to 1860 was civilized and that which comes today is,
in great proportion semi-barbarous.”271 Another symptom of discomfort with new
immigrants prior to WWI was the change in the motto of the National
Americanization Committee from “Many Peoples, But One Nation” to “America
First” and their proposal that all immigrants seek citizenship within three years or
face deportation.272
The Dillingham Report made one admission that rarely surfaced in
the discussion of immigrants: “it is difficult to define and still more difficult
to correctly measure the tendency of newer immigrant races toward
265

266
267
268
269
270
271
272

Sources of Immigration to the United States, 1820-1944, 2 IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV. MONTHLY REV.
77 (1944). The decline in immigration from southern and eastern Europe in 1920–1930 resulted from the
severe quotas adopted by the Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153.
DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 1, supra note 31, at 24.
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 24, 26–28.
PERLMANN, supra note 36, at 32.
See ARCHDEACON, supra note 71, at 167. Not everyone was so dismissive of new immigrants. President
Cleveland’s veto of an anti-immigration bill in 1897 reminded the public that “[t]he time is quite within recent
memory when the same [negative things were] said of immigrants who, with their descendants, are now
numbered among our best citizens.” DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 39, supra note 31, at 48.
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Americanization, or assimilation into the body of the American people.”273
But the Report then reverted to pessimism about the assimilation of the
new immigrants: “[i]f, however, the tendency to acquire citizenship, to learn
the English language, and to abandon native customs and standards of
living may be considered as factors, it is found that many of the more recent
immigrants are backward in this regard, while some have made excellent
progress.”274 Of special note was their living arrangements; because it was
common for them to live together in boarding houses and work together, the
result (in the view of the Dillingham Report) was that they had little
incentive to learn English, become acquainted with American institutions,
or adopt American standards.275
Martha Ragsdale’s 1928 book tells the same story. She describes how
immigration trends shifted in 1880 toward southern and eastern Europeans, whose
“looks, habits, and temperament [differed] from the Nordic stock.”276 “The coming in
of people who will not be assimilated creates discord”277 and tends toward
deterioration of political institutions.278 The 1920 Republican Party platform stated
that immigration “should not exceed that which can be assimilated with reasonable
rapidity, and . . . favor[ed] immigrants whose standards are similar to ours.”279
In the eugenics spirit of that era,280 the negative view of certain
Mediterranean types was put in physical terms, describing the “dark
Mediterranean subspecies” as having smaller skulls than Nordics, with stunted
stature and weak musculature.281 This led to Madison Grant’s conclusion that if the
Melting Pot boiled out of control, “the type of native American [sic] . . . will become
as extinct as the Athenian of the age of Pericles . . . .”282]
The negative characterization of the new immigrants from southern and
eastern Europe never reached the point of treating them like Asians. They had socalled “inbetween” status, as evidenced by attitudinal surveys in the 1920s that
placed them on a spectrum between the higher ranked northern and western
Europeans and the lower-ranked Asians from Japan and China.283 They were also
273
274
275
276
277
278
279

280

281
282
283

DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 1, supra note 31, at 42.
Id.
See id.
RAGSDALE, supra note 63, at 10.
Id. at 12.
See id.
Id. at 13. An article in a Japanese newspaper expressed the same negative view of the new immigrants. It
objected to the California law prohibiting land ownership by aliens ineligible for citizenship (obviously
aimed at Japanese immigrants) because it treated Japanese immigrants worse than people of “third-rate
southern and eastern European nations living in the United States.” See Ichioka, supra note 127, at 5–6.
See ARCHDEACON, supra note 71, at 161 (eugenics was much in vogue in the United States on the eve of
World War I).
See NANCY FONER, FROM ELLIS ISLAND TO JFK: NEW YORK’S TWO GREAT WAVES OF IMMIGRATION 144 (2000).
MADISON GRANT, THE PASSING OF THE GREAT RACE 228 (1916).
See LÓPEZ, supra note 12, at 105–06. The use of the term “inbetween” to describe the new immigrants is
explained in James R. Barrett & David Roediger, Inbetween Peoples: Race, Nationality and the “New
Immigrant” Working Class, 16 J. AM. ETHNIC HIST. 3, 3–34 (1997).
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“inbetween” Black people and Whites, which meant that discrimination in housing
and the workplace was never as severe for the new immigrants as it was for Black
people; and while intermarriage between Black people and Whites remained taboo,
Italians could marry whomever they chose without similar resistance.284
Consequently, as recounted below, the new immigrants became targets of a 1917
law imposing literacy requirements on immigrants and a 1924 law imposing harsh
quotas, but never experienced the blanket prohibition on immigration that applied
to Asian immigrants.
The first major federal legislation to come out of these negative views
of southern and eastern Europeans was the adoption in 1917 of a literacy
test, which required immigrants to be able to read thirty to eighty words in a
language of their choice.285 Although this requirement applied regardless of where
the immigrants came from, it was widely understood as “An Intelligent and
Effective Restriction” 286 to prevent immigration by the less desirable new
immigrants.287 An 1896 Senate Report had earlier explained that the use of a
literacy test would bar immigration by those “most alien in language and origin to
the people who founded the 13 colonies” and “would tell most heavily against those
classes of immigrants which now furnish paupers, diseased and criminal . . . .”288 A
literacy test was even described in a 1916 cartoon as establishing an “Amercanese
Wall.”289 The illiteracy data among new immigrants explained why a literacy test
was useful as an exclusionary tactic. From 1899 to 1909, illiteracy among
prospective immigrants ranged from 24.3% (Slovaks) to 46.9% (Italians), but the
range for the old immigrants (Irish and German immigrants) was from 2.7% (Irish)
to 5.1% (Germans).290
The second major immigration legislation in the early 20th century was a
1924 law which adopted harsh immigration quotas. This legislation was aimed
primarily at southern and eastern Europeans, and based on the percentage of U.S.
population from particular countries in 1890 (a 2% limit).291 Advocates of these
quotas characterized the literacy test as a frail barrier.292 Chairman Johnson of the
House Committee on Immigration had begun to push for quota laws as early as
1914 but was not successful until after WWI when immigration resumed in large
numbers in the face of wartime destruction in Europe.293 Johnson buttressed his
284
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287
288
289

290
291

292
293

See Barrett & Roediger, supra note 283, at 4; Orsi, supra note 260, at 316–18.
See Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 877 (applicable to an immigrant over
sixteen years of age).
See generally ZOLBERG, supra note 18, at 199–242.
ZOLBERG, supra note 18, at 234.
DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 39, supra note 31, at 47.
See Raymond O. Evans, The Americanese Wall, as Congressman Burnett Would Build It, HERB: RESOURCES
FOR TEACHERS, https://herb.ashp.cuny.edu/items/show/2301 (last visited Apr. 19, 2020).
ARCHDEACON, supra note 71, at 152.
See H.R. REP. NO. 176, at 3 (1924). The 1924 law followed a similar 1921 law, which had a 3% limit based on
the 1910 population. See id. at 2.
See U.S. DEP’T LAB., ANN. REP. COMM’R NATURALIZATION TO SEC’Y LAB. 3–4 (1923).
See PERLMANN, supra note 36, at 204.
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case for quotas by appointing Dr. Harry Laughlin, a geneticist with the Eugenics
Records Office, as the Committee’s eugenics expert.294 His expertise produced an
“Analysis of America’s Modern Melting Pot” (1920), which purported to show the
relationship between biology, immigration, and the risk of social degeneracy. His
analysis found that recent immigration trends presented a higher percentage of
“inborn socially inadequate qualities than do the older stocks.” He reminded the
committee that America’s commitment to democracy had left out what a scientist
familiar with breeding plants and animals knows, that there are “blood or natural
inborn hereditary mental and moral differences.”295 His data purported to show that
crime and disease were more prevalent among southern and eastern Europeans.296
The 1924 law was very successful in achieving its aim of drastically reducing the
influx of new immigrants. From 1925–1927, the quota for northern/western
Europeans was 142,483, for southern/eastern Europeans 18,439.297
The dominant theme, expressed in a committee report to the 1924 law, was
that an undigested mass of alien thought, alien sympathy, and alien purpose was
intolerable; for the country to endure, the nation’s homogeneity must be
preserved.298 The report went on to describe the immigrants’ lack of government
traditions that made assimilation difficult—their familiarity with state control, lack
of independent courts, and living under laws not made by the people.299
The absence of a total ban on white European immigration contrasted with a
provision in the 1924 law that had the effect of banning Japanese immigration. This
was achieved by prohibiting anyone from immigrating unless they could be
naturalized, which (after Ozawa) ruled out Japanese immigrants.
D. Southern Italians
Italians were by far the largest group of new immigrants (3,820,986 from
1899–1924).300 But it was a subset of this group that caused the most concern.
Southern Italian immigration was a significant multiple of northern Italian
immigration. For example, from 1899–1910, northern Italian immigration was
372,668 and southern Italian was 1,911,933.301 Data provided in a Commissioner294
295
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297

298
299
300
301

See id. at 205–06. For a devastating critique of Laughlin’s analysis of data,.
Regarding mental differences, the biological determinism embraced by the eugenics movement was
supported by a reliance on IQ tests that had been administered to army men during WWI and which were
thought to provide objective data about inherited intelligence. Congressional debates in 1924 relied on the
minimal scores of southern and eastern Europeans on these tests to restrict their immigration. See STEVEN
JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 20, 157, 196, 224–32 (1981).
See PERLMANN, supra note 36, at 206.
Who Was Shut Out?: Immigration Quotas, 1925-1927, HISTORY MATTERS: THE U.S. SURVEY COURSE ON THE
WEB, http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5078 (last visited Jan. 29, 2020); see also U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 100 (1929); PERLMANN, supra note 36, at 227–28 (the Italian
quota in 1925 was 6,203, compared to 283,738 in 1914).
See H.R. REP. NO. 176, at 3, 17 (1924).
See id. at 18.
ARCHDEACON, supra note 71, at 118, 121.
DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 1, supra note 31, at 97.
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General of Immigration report gives the following breakdown of northern and
southern Italian immigration—northern, 44,802, southern, 251,612 (1913–14);
northern 27,459, southern, 195,037 (1920–21); northern, 9,054, southern, 39,226
(1922–23).302 In 1907 there were 240,000 southern Italian immigrants, but northern
Italians were one-fifth of that number.303
Southern Italians did not easily fit into American culture, frequently treated
as almost Black. They were characterized as “not-yet-white” and were labeled
“‘black dagoes’ as neither Black nor white.”304 They were described in the press as
“swarthy, kinky-haired” and were contrasted with northern Italians who were
“Teutonic” Italians.305 They were even made to sit in the back row of churches with
Black people.306 Several commentators struck a similar theme. A New York Times
article, entitled “How Italians Became ‘White,’” noted that darker-skinned southern
Italians suffered the stigma of Blackness on both sides of the Atlantic.307 The article
explained that northern Italians considered the southern Italians, especially
Sicilians, as inferior; southerners were guineas (a slur usually applied to Blacks)
and dagoes; “they were sometimes shut out of schools, movie houses, and labor
unions”; they accepted Black jobs and lived in Black neighborhoods.308 Northern
Italians denigrated their southern neighbors as Turks, deriding them as “Africans”
and of African ancestry.309 One observer noted that northern and southern Italians
were viewed as biologically different, almost a different species.310 Another
commentator noted the negative view that northern Italians held of southern
Italians, describing them as “culturally and/or innately inferior. . . disposed to crime
and violence.”311
Thomas Guglielmo painted a derogatory image of southern Italians in
Chicago: they were “excitable, impulsive . . . impracticable,”312 “criminally inclined
mongrels”, and “worshippers of power [like the] Chinese.”313 He believed that,
unlike the northern Italians, they were not fit for citizenship.314 They were thought
302
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U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION TO THE SECRETARY OF
LABOR 10 (1923).
DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 5, supra note 36, at 84.
DAVID ROEDIGER, TOWARDS THE ABOLITION OF WHITENESS 186 (1994).
Orsi, supra note 260, at 313, 315.
Id. at 316. Even today the similarity of Black people to some Italians was worthy of comment. On the February
4, 2020, edition of the Daily Show on the Comedy Channel, Roy Wood Jr. delivered the following introduction:
“Good evening Black people, African Americans, people of color, and really tan Italian people.” The Daily
Show: 2020 State of the Union Special (Comedy Central television broadcast Feb. 5, 2020).
See Brent Staples, How Italians Became ‘White’, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/10/12/opinion/columbus-day-italian-american-racism.html.
Id.
Orsi, supra note 260, at 315.
Id. at 324 n.7.
RICHARD GAMBINO, BLOOD OF MY BLOOD: THE DILEMMA OF THE ITALIAN-AMERICANS 105 (1974).
THOMAS A. GUGLIELMO, WHITE ON ARRIVAL: ITALIANS, RACE, COLOR, AND POWER IN CHICAGO, 1890-1945, at 23
(2004).
Id. at 24.
Id. at 23.
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to have Negroid ancestry.315 The House Committee on Immigration and
Naturalization even debated about whether a southern Italian was a full-blooded
Caucasian.316 A spokesperson for the Chicago Italian Chamber of Commerce told an
interviewer that northern and southern Italians were different races, speaking
different languages.317
Guglielmo gave further evidence that southern Italians were viewed as
inferior. A Mississippi town attempted to bar them from schools; some state
legislators tried to disenfranchise them along with Black people; and a Louisiana
sugar cane boss referred to them as n******.318 One observer said that southern
Italians were as different from northern Italians as an alligator pear is different
from an alligator.319 Another distinguished northern from southern Italians because
the latter had a “horrifying ‘propensity for personal violence’, ‘ineptness’ for
teamwork, a strong dose of African blood, and a ‘lack of mental ability.’”320 A
magazine urged Congress in 1914 to exclude southern Italians, just like “Asiatics,”
because they were not fit to take part in our government.321
There was even the kind of violence against southern Italians that we usually
associate as having been perpetrated against African Americans. In 1891, eleven
Sicilians were lynched in New Orleans for their alleged role in killing the police
chief.322 This led Italy to break off diplomatic relations and resulted in the Harrison
administration paying indemnity.323 President Harrison even declared a one-time
national celebration of Columbus Day in 1892 as a sign of goodwill.324
Most significantly, the alleged differences between southern and northern
Italians was clearly demarcated in the List of Races or Peoples.325 It described
southerners as “excitable, impulsive, highly imaginative, impracticable; as an
individualist having little adaptability to highly organized society.”326 By contrast,
northern Italians were described as “cool, deliberate, patient, practical, and capable
of great progress in the political and social organization of modern civilization.”327
According to the Dillingham Report, the criminal element was far greater among
the southern Italians, from which the mafia originated, stating: “Italian statistics
[show] that all crimes, and especially violent crimes, are several times more
numerous among the South than the North Italians”328 Southern Italians were also
315
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more likely to be illiterate; in 1901, 48.5% of all Italians were illiterate, but the
illiteracy rate for the Calabria region in southern Italy was 78.7%.329 The distinction
between southern and northern Italians also found its way into the U.S.
government’s annual reports of immigration data, both as to the numbers of
immigrants and the cross-tabulation of various characteristics.330
Still, despite concerns about the ability of southern Italians to assimilate and
despite their purported similarity to Black people, they were never barred from
immigrating or from becoming naturalized “white” citizens, which was the fate
suffered by Asian immigrants. But why this discrepancy? The remainder of this
Article answers this question by focusing on a comparison of southern Italians with
Indians. Rather than ask why southern Italians escaped “nonwhite” status, we ask
why Indians did not achieve the same “white” status as southern Italians.331
IV. WHY SOUTHERN ITALIANS, BUT NOT INDIANS?
There are four possible explanations for treating southern Italians and
Indians differently for naturalization and immigration purposes—census practice, a
disparity in political power, different perceptions of the ability to assimilate, and
disparate treatment of Europeans and Asians.
A. Census
The government officials who recorded census data always defined southern
and eastern Europeans as “white” by placing a “W” in the “color” or “color or race”
column.332 Guglielmo gives this census practice as one explanation for why southern
Italians were considered “white,” because the census undoubtedly influenced public
perceptions and, by inference, the decisions made by those responsible for
naturalization.333 This meant that all southern and eastern Europeans could claim
329
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See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION TO THE
SECRETARY OF LABOR 32, 35 (1922) (showing the number admitted and departed and their sex, age, and
length of residence).
The possibility that Indians were at least as worthy as “white” southern Italians occurred to one observer
who noted that “Indians are . . . far more hygienic in their methods of living than . . . some of the southern
Europeans.” 1914 Hindu Immigration Hearings, supra note 171, Part V, at 155. Moreover, Guglielmo’s
arguments for why southern Italians were always considered “white” also applied to Indians. First,
Guglielmo notes that scientific taxonomies placed Italians in the white category; this was the older
traditional taxonomy of white, black, red, brown, and yellow, not the more recent taxonomy advanced by the
Bureau of Immigration and taken up by the Dillingham Commission, which divided white Europeans by
race. See GUGLIELMO, supra note 312, at 29. But Indians could also rely on scientific taxonomy, which some
courts invoked to label Indians as Caucasian. See GUGLIELMO, supra note 312. Second, as a counter to their
alleged African/Negroid admixture, southern Italians claimed a link to the ancient Greek and Etruscan
civilizations, in contrast to the backward wild men of northern Europe who went about in “the skins of wild
beasts.” Id. at 30. But Indians could also claim a link to an ancient, advanced civilization, as the
government’s brief in the Thind case conceded. See Brief for the United States, supra note 211, at 21.
See supra text accompanying notes 52–56 (discussing the history of the use of the “color” and “color or race”
categories).
GUGLIELMO, supra note 312, at 30–31.
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to be members of the superior white “color division of mankind,” even if they were
members of an inferior race; they were just not that inferior.334
If it were true that the census always recorded Indians as other than
“white”—either “Hindu” or “Other” depending on the available categories—then
census practice would help to explain why Indian immigrants could not be
naturalized under prevailing law. But census practice was not uniform. As noted
earlier, census records sometimes referred to Indians as “white,”335 presumably
reflecting the uncertainty that existed prior to the Thind decision. The census
records do not, therefore, explain why southern Italians were “white” and Indians
were not. Moreover, judicial decisions and administrative practice did not always
follow the categorization of Indian immigrants as other than “white” in the census
records.336
B. Political Power
Earlier discussions of Irish and Japanese immigrants called attention to the
possibility that their voting power would be used to achieve significant political
power―an actuality in the case of the urban Irish immigrants and a remote fear in
the case of the Japanese immigrants. Similarly, the voting power of southern and
eastern European immigrants might have dampened any inclination to label any
subset of Italian immigrants as “nonwhite.” If the government had denied southern
Italian immigrants citizenship in the early 1900s, there might have been a political
backlash from members of this group who already had the vote,337 as well as from
descendants of those without the vote who had acquired birthright citizenship.
Although it is impossible to be sure how Italian voters would have reacted to
denying their compatriots the opportunity to be naturalized, one commentator notes
that “[m]any politicians of the Progressive Era tailored their thinking about the
racial desirability of the new European immigrants to appeal to the ‘foreign’
vote.”338 She gives the example of Woodrow Wilson’s 1912 campaign for the
presidency, in which he “repudiated the contemptuous phrases” he had used to
describe southern and eastern Europeans in a history text he had written ten years
earlier.339 And, in 1916, when the question arose why Africa was not included in the
areas from which immigration was forbidden, one senator suggested that it was
because Black individuals voted.340 Perlmann also suggests that Henry Cabot
334
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336
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Id. at 63.
See supra text accompanying note 212.
See supra text accompanying notes 214–20.
These southern and eastern European voters would have included previously naturalized citizens as well as
noncitizens in those few states that did not require voters to be citizens, at least if they had declared their
intention to gain citizenship. See ZOLBERG, supra note 18, at 110. It was not until 1996 that Congress made
citizenship a requirement for voting in federal elections. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act, 18 U.S.C. § 611.
FONER, supra note 281, at 146.
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See 54 CONG. REC. 156–57 (1916) (statement of Sen. Reed).
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Lodge’s defense of Irish immigrants had something to do with Irish-American voters
in Massachusetts and that some senators’ opposition to the complete exclusion of
certain groups of immigrants was their sensitivity to “foreign-born voters.”341 And
Zolberg notes that one of the advantages of using a literacy test to limit
immigration was that party managers would have opposed an exclusion based
explicitly on racial categories because of the foreign vote.342
To the extent that political power was at all relevant to determining who
could be naturalized, Indian immigrants were at a disadvantage compared to
Italians. There were simply too few Indian immigrants to constitute a political
threat. Archdeacon notes that Italian immigration from 1899–1924 equaled
3,820,986 but Indian immigration equaled 8,234.343 After the Thind decision, there
were some protests from educated Indians, Protestant missionaries in India,
American liberal journals, and some nationalist groups in India, but nothing of real
significance and certainly nothing organized or vocal from lower-caste Indians.344
Moreover, political power worked to Indian immigrants’ disadvantage. Opposition to
Indians came from California, which was a swing state whose political power in
national elections was of concern to national parties.345
Another way in which political power might have worked against Indian
immigrants was the absence of a credible threat from the Indian government. We
earlier encountered effective complaints by the Italian, Turkish, and Japanese
governments about the U.S. treatment of immigrants from these countries. Italy
protested the lynching of Italians in New Orleans,346 Turkey objected to the denial
of naturalization on the ground that Turks were not “white,”347 and Japan objected
to discrimination in San Francisco schools.348 But the Indian government could not
be expected to support Indian immigrants in the United States. India was still a
British colony, and the British government supported the exclusionists.349
Moreover, Britain was unlikely to come to the defense of Indian immigrants in the
United States after about 100 Indians had used the United States as a base to
341
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See PERLMANN, supra note 36, at 58, 205.
See ZOLBERG, supra note 18, at 211.
ARCHDEACON, supra note 71, at 118–19.
See Hess, supra note 17, at 66. Beginning in the 1930s, a pro-Indian political movement eventually led to
allowing Indians to be naturalized. See id. at 71–79. When Indians were allowed to be naturalized in 1946,
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naturalization but with a low quota (100 annually). Id. at 78–79.
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(California was a swing state in national elections; seven of eight anti-Chinese laws were passed on the eve
of a national election); see also accompanying text supra notes 195–200 (stating that opposition to Indians
was expressed by Representative Church of California). Cf. ZOLBERG, supra note 18, at 188 (the fact that
Chinese could not vote to counteract the anti-Chinese bias in western states was one factor in the passage of
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develop a plan to gain independence from Britain with the furtive support of
Germany.350
Absence of political power is not, however, a justification for how Indian
immigrants were treated. It is only an explanation. The next section considers an
important contemporary justification for concluding that Indians were not “white”
as well as for barring them from immigrating to the United States—the difficulty of
assimilation.
C. Ability to Assimilate—The Empirical Standard
As noted earlier, the Thind Court dismissed the possibility of Indian
assimilation.351 At the same time, however, the Court wrote affirmatively of the
ability of southern and eastern Europeans to assimilate. The opinion argued that,
although Congress’s affirmative intent in 1790 was to limit naturalization to people
coming from the British Isles and Northwestern Europe, “[t]he succeeding years
brought immigrants from Eastern, Southern and Middle Europe, among them the
Slavs and the dark-eyed, swarthy people of Alpine and Mediterranean stock, and
these were received as unquestionably akin to those already here and readily
amalgamated with them.”352
The facts, however, call into question any unfavorable comparison of Indians
to southern Italians. On several assimilationist criteria, Indians seemed to fare
better. As for literacy, the Dillingham Report noted a low literacy level for Indians,
but southern Italians were worse. From 1899–1910, the percentage of persons aged
fourteen or over who could neither read nor write was: southern Italians, 53.9%;
northern Italians, 11.5%; Indians, 47.2%; and Japanese, 24.6%.353 As for the risk of
becoming a public charge, data also indicated that Indians were better than
southern Italians. Although there was no requirement that immigrants have any
particular amount of money when they arrived, they were required to say whether
they had more than $30 (later raised to $50), and the answer was recorded in the
ship manifest. This information provides some evidence of whether an immigrant
would become a public charge, even though the accuracy of these amounts might be
questioned because the records depended on the amount shown to inspectors. From
1899–1903, 74.6% of the Indian immigrants had $30, or more; and from 1904–1910,
27.9% had $50 or more. For southern Italian immigrants, the percentages were
6.9% and 5.4%, respectively.354 As for the risk of criminality, southern Italians were
350
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See Hess, supra note 17, at 65; see also COULSON, supra note 222, at 47 (suggesting that Thind’s involvement
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See supra text accompanying note 241.
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See id. at 102–03. The Commissioner-General of Immigration also compiled statistics for 1904 and 1908
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U.S. IMMIGR. COMM’N, IMMIGRANTS AS CHARITY SEEKERS, S. DOC. NO. 61-665, at 320 tbl.44 (3d Sess. 1910). No
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often identified as having criminal tendencies, including a mafia connection;355
Indians were not usually viewed in that light.356
It is true that Italian immigrants could make a strong factual case that they
were trying to assimilate based on their leading the list of participants in various
Americanization programs,357 which were established to teach citizenship in the
schools.358 Twenty states created such programs between 1919 and 1921,359
probably in response to the Commissioner of Naturalization’s observation that there
had been a “childish confidence” that a certificate of naturalization alone could
secure Americanization and a growing recognition by the courts that they had to be
“more painstaking . . . to insure admittance” of only those “genuinely attached to
the principles of the American form of government.”360
Italian immigrants were also the specific targets of government efforts
to advance their assimilation.361 The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs
persuaded the U.S. government to set up a bureau of information and
protection, staffed by Italians nominated by the Italian ambassador.362 This
bureau was expected to provide information about potential jobs in different
states, including central and western states where farm or mining work was
available, thereby reducing immigrant crowding in New York City363 and
finding work that did not displace U.S. workers.
But why didn’t Indian immigrants appear to have the same potential
for assimilation? As Perlmann suggests, the critical question was whether
“the assimilative process of the republic transform[s] the descendants enough to
make them unrecognizable, mentally and spiritually, from their immigrant
forbearers.”364 The Dillingham Report made a similar point:
The most potent influence in promoting the assimilation of the
family is the children, who, through contact with American life
in the schools, almost invariably act as the unconscious agents
in the uplift of their parents. Moreover, as the children grow
older and become wage earners, they usually enter some higher
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deported after three years: SO (72), NO (4); deported after one year; SO (57), NO (1). For 1908—debarred:
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See supra text accompanying note 190. But see supra text accompanying note 200 (comments by
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See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T LAB., ANN. REP. COMM’R NATURALIZATION TO SEC’Y LAB. 74–75 (1919); U.S. DEP’T LAB.
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eds., 1999).
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(1896).
See id.
See id. at 45.
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occupation than that of their fathers, and in such cases the
Americanizing influence upon their parents continues until
frequently the whole family is gradually led away from the old
surroundings and old standards into those more nearly
American.365
The disadvantage Indian immigrants faced was that neither they nor their children
had been here for sufficient time in sufficient numbers to demonstrate their ability
to assimilate. And, as one person noted, waiting for grandchildren to assimilate
was too long.366
So the question becomes: Why wasn’t there a willingness to wait and see
whether assimilation was realistic for recent Indian immigrants and their
children?367 The answer lies in the difference between two views of the
potential for assimilation. One view assumes that individual traits are
socially constructed and capable of being modified over time by the
environment;368 the other view assumes that racial characteristics are
genetically hardwired into the blood of an individual who belongs to a
particular group so that inborn character traits would persist despite changes in
an individual’s environment.369
In keeping with the eugenics spirit of the times,370 southern Italians and
Indians were viewed as separate species with “bad” genes,371 but Indians were
viewed to have been at a special genetic disadvantage. Although there was
tolerance of “mixing genes”372 with new immigrants (including southern Italians)
through intermarriage,373 there was visceral opposition to the gene-mixing that
would occur if Indians and Whites married.374 Opposition amounting to revulsion
against intermarriage with Indians was apparent in comments made in the 1914
hearings dealing with Hindu immigration. Congressman Raker of California
wanted to make sure that intermarriage remained a remote possibility, stating: “I
365
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DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 1, supra note 31, at 42. There was even evidence from a
study by Columbia Professor Boas of children in New York and its immediate vicinity that the
physical characteristics of children of European immigrants showed positive differences from
their immigrant foreign-born parents! See id. at 44.
See ZOLBERG, supra note 18, at 211.
A wait-and-see attitude influenced at least one observer in 1894 to alter his restrictionist view of
immigration and come around to the view that placed the second generation in the “assimilator” category,
having “been subjected to the influence of American life.” Id. at 215.
For example, IQ test scores rose as years of residence in the United States increased. See GOULD, supra note
295, at 220–21.
ZOLBERG, supra note 18, at 207–08..
See ARCHDEACON, supra note 71, at 161.
Orsi, supra note 260, at 342 n.7 (northern and southern Italians are so different that they are “almost a
different species”).
The racist and pseudoscientific idea of “gene mixing” was an outgrowth of the eugenics movement.
See PERLMANN, supra note 36, at 62.
As an example of the vociferous opposition, Madison Grant stated in his book, The Passing of the Great
Race, that “Whether we like to admit of or not, the result of the mixture of two races, in the long run, gives
us a race reverting to the more ancient, generalized and lower type. The cross between a white man and an
Indian is an Indian . . . .” GRANT, supra note 282, at 18 (1916).
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understand from what you said that you would not claim that there should be any
intermarriage between those in America of the Caucasian race and the Hindus. . .
.”375 He later repeated this objection to intermarriage: “As a matter of fact, you
would deplore, would you not, a mixture of races between the Caucasian race now in
America and the Hindus, as a general principle,”376 and he urged exclusion of
Indians so as “not to put them in a position to [intermarry].”377 A later colloquy
between congressmen Raker and Church repeated this theme: Raker stated, “[f]rom
your observation as to assimilation, from the marriage standpoint, it is
unthinkable,”378 and Church replied, “[i]ndeed, it is.”379
In sum, Indian immigrants and their children were thought to lack the
potential for assimilation because they were considered a separate species with a
gene pool that made assimilation almost impossible. Consequently, they were
denied both citizenship and the opportunity to immigrate. By contrast, southern
Italians (along with other new immigrants) were viewed to have had “bad” genes,
but not so bad that it made assimilation impossible. They were, therefore, more
amenable to being influenced by their new environment and were only subject to
harsh immigration quotas and could become naturalized citizens.
D. Europeans vs. Asians – The Normative Standard
There is something a bit forced in trying to distinguish the ability of southern
Italian immigrants and Indian immigrants to assimilate based on their genes. This
suggests that there is another more disturbing way to understand why Indian
immigrants (and other Asians) were treated differently from southern Italian
immigrants. The distinction between Indians and southern Italians was a proxy for
a broader distinction—between Asians and Europeans.
This distinction did not rest on a judgment about the ability to assimilate to
the American way of life, which is an empirical question, but instead implemented a
normative choice of whom we wanted to be Americans. The United States
immigration and naturalization laws implemented this choice by distinguishing
people geographically; undesirable Asians (people of color) were denied
opportunities available to desirable Europeans (whites).380 White Europeans,
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1914 Hindu Immigration Hearings, supra note 171, Part I, at 15.
Id. at 30.
Id.
1914 Hindu Immigration Hearings, supra note 171, Part II, at 85.
Id. No mention was made of Punjabi-Indian intermarriage with Mexicans, presumably because that
mixture of species was not threatening to whites. See PRASHAD, supra note 250, at 128; see also In Search of
Bengali Harlem, PBS, http://bengaliharlem.com/thedocumentary/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2022) (discussing a
PBS documentary which recounts the history of “illegal” South Asian Muslim men who married AfricanAmerican and Puerto Rican women between WWI and the 1940s and merged into communities of color in
Harlem and the Lower East Side).
The white/nonwhite distinction is identified geographically in THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY,
2001 edition, which draws a divide between Asia and Europe in its definition of a “person of color” as “a
person who is not white or of European parentage.” A similar distinction is made in THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY USAGE AND STYLE 356 (Houghton Mifflin

2022]

A Heritage of Bias

387

though subject to restrictive quotas, could still immigrate to the United States and
could be naturalized under prevailing immigration law, but non-white Asian
immigrants could not. This suggests that the recurrent theme of assimilation,
recounted in prior pages, was a way to disguise normative racist policies as
empirical science, in much the same way that “scientific” eugenics was racist at its
core.381
Once you begin to look for references to an Asian/European divide in the
political debates and judicial decisions about immigration and naturalization, they
pop up frequently. Perlmann notes that the differences among European races and
between Europeans and Asians were viewed as raising discrete issues in political
debates. For example, in the 1924 debates about excluding immigrants, members of
Congress spoke about racial differences among Europeans and racial differences
between whites and nonwhites as separate subjects, never comparing the two kinds
of differences: “In the debates over desired and undesired White races, there was
usually no mention of non-white immigration. In the debates over the Japanese
clauses, there was almost never a mention of the continuum of white race
desirability.”382 Despite the distinction between different European races, European
differences appeared to be minor when compared to the differences between white
(European) and non-white (Asian) races.383
Legal discussion also highlighted the Asian/European divide. The
government’s brief in Thind contrasted the ability of Europeans and Indians to
assimilate, illustrated by the following quotes from Edmund Burke’s 1788 speech to
Parliament during the impeachment trial of Governor Warren Hastings. Burke
characterized the Indian people as “unalliable to any other part of mankind,” 384 and
explained that “the Hindues [sic] were regarded as a people wholly alien to Western
habits and customs, mode of life, political and social institutions.” 385 But the brief
then goes on to draw a seemingly unbridgeable gap between Europe and Asia,
explaining that the label white is “inclusive only of such men . . . as belonged to a
civilization known as the white civilization. Such was the civilization of Europe. . . .
Thus, the term ‘white men’ had come to represent men of the white civilization, as
distinguished from the Eastern or Oriental civilization.”386
The European/Asian distinction also came up in a number of cases where the
applicant for naturalization was on the Europe/Asia border. In a 1925 decision,
right after Thind, the court held that an Armenian from Asia Minor could be
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Company 2005), which states that “person of color . . . [is] used inclusively of all non-European peoples.”
Thus, “white” is European; nonwhite is non-European.
Nothing more clearly establishes the racism underlying eugenics than Hitler’s referring to Grant’s book as
his “bible”. STEFAN KÜHL, NAZI CONNECTION: EUGENICS, AMERICAN RACISM, AND GERMAN NATIONAL SOCIALISM
85 (2002)
See PERLMANN, supra note 36, at 402.
See id. at 239.
Brief for the United States, supra note 211, at 11.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 16. Cf. id. at 20–21 (the conclusion that the Semitic races were “assimilable” rested on the fact that
they had “roots [that] became blended into the European civilization of Rome”).
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naturalized as a white person.387 The court noted that Armenians are a Christian
people living in an area close to the European border, who have intermingled and
intermarried with Europeans over a period of centuries.388 Also, in Halladjian, the
court asked whether Armenians may “become westernized and readily adaptable to
European standards” and stated they could because “[t]hey have dealt in business
with Greeks, Slavs, and Hebrews, as well as with Turks, . . . and they have pursued
by immigration the civilization of Great Britain and of the United States.”389 Much
later, in 1944, a decision holding that Arabs were “white” also stressed their
European link.390
It is possible to argue that the European/Asian divide was a blunt,
overgeneralized way of answering the empirical question—who can and cannot
assimilate? But there are strong indications that this geographical division is better
understood as a way to implement a normative definition of who should be an
American. As one member of Congress expressed it, “we wanted to preserve the
homogeneity of the White race.”391 Once you set racial homogeneity as the goal, it
does not matter how good outsiders might be at assimilating. The presence of
Indians and other Asians would undermine a vision of a homogenous white
society.392 In the end, the United States’ attitude toward Indians may not have been
all that different from the view advanced by the Royal Commissioner of Canada,
who stated “that Canada should remain a white man’s country.”393 The United
States of the early twentieth century was no less committed than Canada to
remaining a homogeneously European/white nation.394
The United States tried to construct a homogeneous white nation piecemeal,
as best it could, through the adoption of laws that excluded Asian immigration and
naturalization. An 1882 statute prevented Chinese from immigrating and denied
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United States v. Cartozian, 6 F.2d 919, 922 (D. Or. 1925).
See id. at 920.
In re Halladjian, 174 F. 834, 841 (D. Mass. 1909).
Ex parte Mohriez, 54 F. Supp. 941, 942 (D. Mass. 1944) (“As every schoolboy knows, the Arabs have at
various times inhabited parts of Europe, lived along the Mediterranean, been contiguous to European
nations and been assimilated culturally and otherwise, by them. . . . Indeed, to earlier centuries as to the
twentieth century, the Arab people stand as one of the chief channels by which the traditions of white
Europe, especially the ancient Greek traditions, have been carried into the present. . . . It follows that even
by the narrow criteria which were adopted in the opinions of Mr. Justice Sutherland the Arab passes
muster as a white person.”). See also In re Charr, 273 F. 207, 209 (W.D. Mo. 1921) (the statutory language
limiting naturalization to “white persons” should “be construed . . . as a geographical term, referring to the
peoples who were commonly known in the United States as those inhabiting Europe . . . .”).
See 54 CONG. REC. 159 (1916) (statement of Sen. Vardaman); see also 51 CONG. REC. 2785 (1914) (statement
in the 1914 Congressional Record expressing opposition to Japanese immigration because it threatened
American homogeneity); supra note 298 and accompanying text (explaining that the 1924 law imposing
immigration quotas helped to preserve homogeneity).
That might explain why we prevented Indian immigrants from becoming naturalized citizens, despite the
affirmative view of Indians in the government’s brief in Thind, expressing a “full appreciation of the
wonderful civilization of the Far East.” Brief for the United States, supra note 211, at 21.
DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 23, supra note 118, at 329.
See ZOLBERG, supra note 18, at 248.
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them the opportunity to become naturalized citizens;395 a 1917 statute prevented
Indians from immigrating;396 a 1923 Supreme Court decision denied Indians the
right to be naturalized;397 a 1922 Supreme Court case prevented Japanese
naturalization;398 and a 1924 statute prevented Japanese people from immigrating
(because immigration was denied to those who could not be naturalized).399 The
result was that nonwhite Asians would not be added to the existing stock of
Americans. Instead of worrying about whether Asian immigrants could in fact
assimilate, the United States did its best to prevent nonwhite Asians from
assimilating in the first place by denying them the opportunity to become citizens
and by keeping them out of the country.
CONCLUSION
“The past is never dead, it’s not even past.”400
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the judiciary and
Congress sublimated their fear that immigrants would bring crime, disease, and
poverty into an inference that newcomers could not become assimilated Americans.
In a more virulent form, these fears morphed into the racist goal of preserving a
white homogeneous America. The result was restrictive naturalization and
immigration policies. Today similar fears have resulted in restricting Muslim and
Latines immigration to the United States,401 stoked by the racist ideology known as
“replacement theory,” which posits that nonwhite immigrants threaten to replace
the existing stock of white Americans.402
The historical and contemporary parallels are clearly apparent in the
following statement to an NPR interviewer by John Kelly, the White House chief of
staff, in 2018. Kelly insisted that undocumented immigrants are “not people that
would easily assimilate into the United States into our modern society.” 403
Why? Because, Kelly believes, “[t]hey’re overwhelmingly rural people in the
countries they come from—fourth, fifth, sixth-grade educations are kind of the
norm. They don’t speak English . . . . They don’t integrate well, they don’t
have skills.”404
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Equally true to history was Kelly’s amnesia. In 1897, when new
immigrants were viewed with suspicion, President Cleveland’s veto message
accompanying an anti-immigration bill reminded the public that “[t]he time is quite
within recent memory when the same [negative things were] said of immigrants
who, with their descendants, are now numbered among our best citizens.”405 But
Cleveland spoke to an audience that had lost its memory of how immigrants had
become good Americans. Kelly seemed to have suffered a similar amnesia,
forgetting that his negative view of immigrants had been attributed to several of
his ancestors—four from Italy (two possibly from southern Italy) and three from
Ireland.406 The surnames and geographic origins (to the extent known) of Kelly’s
four Italian ancestors were: Joseph Pedalino (Avellino in southern Italy); Rosa
Paterno (a southern Italian name; married to Pedalino); John DeMarco (a name
found in both northern and southern Italy); Crescenza Bardo (a northern Italian
name; married to DeMarco).407 As for assimilation, DeMarco did not speak English
after more than a decade in the United States; Bardo did not learn English after
more than 30 years in this country.408
The unrelenting lesson from this history is that bias against the “other” is
deeply embedded in the American psyche. Restrictive assumptions about who can
assimilate and who we want to be Americans are as much a part of “who we are” as
the inclusive ideals that we profess. The hope that motivates this Article is this: we
have a better chance of fulfilling the ideal of inclusiveness by not forgetting this
history than we do by simply bathing in the warm glow of a past that never was.
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DILLINGHAM COMMISSION REPORTS VOLUME 39, supra note 31, at 48.
See Phillip Bump, How John Kelly’s Family History Compares with the Immigrants He Wants to Keep From
Entering, WASH. POST (May 11, 2018, 5:18 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/05/11/how-john-kellys-family-history-compares-tothe-immigrants-he-wants-to-keep-from-entering/.
Id.
Id.

